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I. INTRODUCTION
If you believe what you read in the papers, La Corte Suprema
de Justicia de la Naci6n (the "Argentine Supreme Court") holds
the economic fate of Argentina in its beleaguered hands.' In what
has been hailed as a landmark ruling,2 the Court declared uncon-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law. Prior to
joining the faculty of UT, Professor Jacobs was an Associate General Counsel for
Duke Energy International in its Sao Paulo, Brazil office. Email:
Jacobs@libra.law.utk.edu. The author would like to express her gratitude to Valeria
Macchia, Argentine lawyer extraordinaire, and to the following patient reviewers:
Professors Keith Rosenn, Tom Plank, Carol Parker, Amy Hess, and Dwight Aarons.
Any meritorious content herein can be attributed directly to these individuals; all else
must be claimed by the author.
1. Gilbert Le Gras, Courts Threaten Argentina's Banks, (Sept. 15, 2002), at http:/!
www.news24.com/News24/Finance/Economy/0,4186,2-8-25_1257777,00.html.
2. San Luis, Provincia de c. Estado Nacional, _ FALLOS - (Arg. CSJN Mar. 5,
2003), available at http://www.csjn.gov.ar-images-pdf-SanLuis.wpd.pdf (full Spanish
392 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3
stitutional the controversial Presidential "Pesification" Decree
that forcibly converted billions in U.S. dollar-denominated bank
deposits into pesos. Argentina's President4 direly predicted that
such a ruling could plunge the nation into chaos.'
It is not only Argentina's President who has a stake in the
Court's pesification decision. His government fears that the opin-
ion striking down the decree will imperil the economic recovery
that Argentina appears to be experiencing.' The Argentine banks
also have much riding on the pesification outcome. These institu-
tions warn that the nation's financial system could collapse under
text). While the ruling announces a constitutional principle, discussed in more detail
in Section IV infra, it resolved only one U.S.$247 million claim brought by the
province of San Luis against a state-owned bank, Banco de la Naci6n, regarding
dollar deposits. The ruling did not address the constitutionality of the pesification of
dollar-denominated debt. Argentina Says Next Govt to Tackle 'Pesification' Ruling,
(Mar. 7, 2003), http://news.morningstar.com/news/DJM03/D07/1047093660830.html.
The Argentine legal system does not accommodate class action lawsuits. See
generally Symposium, Challenges to Fragile Democracies in the Americas: Legitimacy
and Accountability, 36 TEX. INT'L L.J. 319, 344 (2001). Further, the ruling did not
resolve the constitutionality of the pesification of dollar-denominated debt. San Luis,
Provincia de, __ FALLOS - (Arg. CSJN Mar. 5, 2003), supra. See also Bradley Brooks,
Banks Seek Solution in Argentina, (Mar. 7, 2003), at http://www.upi.comview.cfm?
StoryID=20030307-034734-2729r.
3. DECREE No. 214/02, B.O. (Arg.), 3 Feb. 2002. This decree converted all dollar-
denominated debts and deposits into pesos as part of a package of emergency
measures designed to pull Argentina out of its worst ever financial crisis. See
Argentina Unveils Crisis Package, BBC News, (Feb. 4, 2002), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2fhi/americas/1799402.stm. A detailed examination of the Argentine Executive's
emergency powers is beyond the scope of this Article. For a more extended analysis,
see William C. Banks & Alejandro D. Carrio, Presidential Systems in Stress:
Emergency Powers in Argentina and the United States, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 (1993).
4. This reference is to Eduardo Duhalde, the President of Argentina when these
events transpired. Following President Fernando de la Rua's resignation on
December 20, 2001 amidst violent street protests, the Argentine Congress appointed
Duhalde to be the country's fifth president in two weeks. New Man Takes Helm in
Argentina, BBC News, (Jan. 2, 2002), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hilamericas/1737562.
stm.
5. Gilbert Le Gras, Argentine Leader Says Court Ruling May Bring Chaos, (Sept.
14, 2002), at http://www.forbes.com/newswire/2002/2002/09/14/rtr721431.html.
6. Argentine High Court Postpones Peso Ruling Until Feb, Dow Jones Int'l News,
(Dec. 27, 2002), WL DJINS database. See also Simon Gardner, Argentina Court
Defies State with Dollar Ruling, (Mar. 5, 2003), available at http://www.reuters.com
("[Then Argentine President] Duhalde tried to fight the ruling for fear that it would
endanger stability ahead of the ... vote."). More recently, however, the government
has attempted to downplay its significance. See Larry Rohter, Policy on Peso is
Overturned in Argentina, N.Y. TIMES, (Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.nytimes.
com/2003/03/06/business/worldbusinessl06PESO.html ("Government officials have
been warning for months that any verdict in favor of redollarization would lead to
financial chaos. But as it became increasingly clear that the court intended to rule in
favor of depositors, the government began backing away from those dire
predictions.").
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the weight of the Court's ruling against the decree as they do not
have sufficient reserves to return deposits in the original dollar
currency.7 Conversely, Argentine depositors, many of whom have
watched helplessly while the value of their life savings has
declined steadily,8 fervently hoped that the Court would invalidate
the pesification decree and wildly cheered the ruling.
The pesification issue also has serious implications for the
international community. The International Monetary Fund
("IMF") and other multilateral development institutions and their
member countries, private banks and lenders, and foreign inves-
tors have a direct economic interest in the Court's ruling. Yet,
they also are deeply concerned about Argentina's financial condi-
tion and a possible contagion that might infect Latin America
should Argentina's economic woes worsen and spread.' The possi-
bility of further institutional instability and of a widespread
humanitarian crisis also occupies the minds of Argentina's leaders
and the world community.1
0
The Argentine Supreme Court is not wholly unfamiliar with
this intense scrutiny. In fact, many contend that the Court is
"totally discredited."11 Several of the Court's rulings have
attracted strong criticism. Its seemingly unwavering loyalty to
former President Carlos Menem 12 has resulted in a number of
legally questionable and publicly-reviled decisions, 3 including a
ruling dismissing arms trafficking charges against Menem and
7. See Argentine High Court Postpones Peso Ruling Until Feb, supra note 6.
8. Marcela Valente, A Banking System in Coma, (May 21, 2002), at http://www.
proutworld.org./news/enr2002/may/20020522arg.htm.
9. Argentina: More Chaos, Lat. Bus. Chron., (Feb. 4, 2002), at http://www.
latinbusinesschronicle.com/reports/reports/duhalde.htm.
10. Argentina's Financial Crisis: What is the Solution, BBC News, (Nov. 15, 2002),
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking-point/2480639.stm.
11. See Argentine Judges Face Corruption Probe, BBC News, (Feb. 7, 2002), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1807705.stm.
12. During his 1989-99 Presidency, Menem audaciously expanded the Supreme
Court's membership from five justices to nine. Ley 23.774, [1990-Al A.L.J.A. 64, B.O.
(Arg.), 16 Apr. 1990. This increase, in addition to the resignation of two justices,
enabled Menem to appoint a total of six of the nine judges. See Geronimo Perez,
Comment, Argentina's Supreme Court Enters the Political Fray in a Move Aimed at
Surviving the Public Calls for Impeachment, VIII Sw. J. L. & TRADE Am. 357, 357
(2001-02). This Court-packing plan has eroded the public's confidence in the Court's
independence. See Jonathan Miller, Judicial Review and Constitutional Stability: A
Sociology of the U.S. Model and its Collapse in Argentina, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 77, 80 (1997). Menem's influence appears to continue today, as four of the
nine current justices are Menem-appointees. See Argentine Judges Face Corruption
Probe, supra note 11.
13. See Argentine Judges Face Corruption Probe, supra note 11.
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several rulings on privatization and telephone-tapping widely
regarded as favorable to the former President.14 In the midst of
public pot-banging demonstrations known as cacerolazos where
protesters denounced the Court as being corrupt and politicized
and for protecting its own political agenda, 5 the Argentine Con-
gress even began impeachment hearings into the Court's alleged
abuses of authority. 6
The pesification appeal presented a true Morton's Fork,' or
Catch-22, s for the Argentine Supreme Court. If the Court had
bowed to political pressure and upheld the pesification decree, the
Argentine government certainly would have been pleased. Such a
ruling also may have averted the further erosion of Argentina's
economic landscape.
Yet, a ruling in favor of pesification would have dealt a crush-
ing blow to the hopes of Argentine depositors seeking to recover
the value of their converted deposits, further enraging these
weary citizens and confirming the widely-held belief that the
Court lacks any independence from the country's political appara-
tus. 9 Foreign investors as well as Argentineans would lose all
confidence in the Court for what certainly would have been viewed
as a political decision. A lack of confidence in a country's judicial
system or a lack of alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution
often will make an investment too risky to undertake." Further,
the government's continuing successful efforts to influence the
14. Id.
15. Alfred Hopkins, Running out of Patience, (Feb. 27, 2002), at http://www.
worldpress.orgAmericas/380.cfm.
16. See Argentine Judges Face Corruption Probe, supra note 11. Lawmakers later
voted to abandon the impeachment proceedings, ostensibly to resolve the institutional
instability that appeared to be an obstacle to a foreign aid package. See Argentina
Ditches Bid to Impeach Judges, Tiscali News, (Oct. 11, 2002), at http://www.tiscali.
co.uk.
17. The phrase "Morton's Fork" is derived from English cleric John Morton, the
Bishop of Ely, then Archbishop of Canterbury during the reign of Henry VII. When
collecting taxes from his tenants, Morton argued that the rich clearly could afford to
pay the taxes. If the tenants were poor, however, they were holding onto their money,
so they too could pay the tax. As forks at that time had two prongs, his two-pronged
logic construction was nominated a Morton's Fork. See Morton's Fork, at http://www.
math.iastate.edu/burkardt/wordplay/weirdwords.html.
18. Derived, of course, from the classic Joseph Heller novel of the same name,
originally published in 1961.
19. See Argentine Judges Face Corruption Probe, supra note 11.
20. See Frank C. Shaw, Reconciling Two Legal Cultures in Privatizations and
Large-Scale Capital Projects in Latin America, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 147, 155-56
(1999) (part of a Symposium entitled, The Role of Legal Institutions in the Economic
Development of the Americas, 30 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1 (1999)). When making
investment decisions, investors analyze the degree of legal risk associated with a
394
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nation's courts would pose an increasingly serious moral hazard21
for lawmakers, who appear to be unconstrained by Argentine law
when fashioning remedies and defining policies in times of crises.
The very concept of a constitutional democracy is undermined if
Argentina's highest judicial authority accommodatingly approves
any action taken by the executive and legislative branches of the
government, regardless of the explicit text of the Constitution.22
The Court, however, firmly grasped the other prong of its
Morton's Fork,23 and its ruling against pesification may have pol-
ished the tribunal's tarnished public image, at least temporarily. 24
The Court upheld the nation's Constitution25 and exercised its
independence by resisting intense pressure to toe the line on the
government's economic reform package. 26 This exercise of judicial
independence appears to have bolstered the public's confidence in
the Court as an institution. The ruling drew hundreds of Argen-
potential investment. Id. at 148-49. Legal risks include not only the content of a
nation's laws, but also their enforcement. Id.
21. In financial parlance, the term "moral hazard" refers to excessive risk-taking
in the presence of insurance or other financial guarantees. See Frank Partnoy, Why
Markets Crash and What Law Can Do About It, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 741, 757 n.88
(2000).
22. See generally Alberto F. Garay, Federalism, the Judiciary, and Constitutional
Adjudication in Argentina: A Comparison with the U.S. Constitutional Model, 22 U.
MIAMI INTER-Am. L. REV. 161, 201-02 (1991).
23. The Court also might have elected to delay its ruling until the issue became
moot. This option is discussed further infra Part IV.
24. Questions concerning the Court's motivation for striking down the pesification
decree appeared almost immediately in the press. See, e.g., Daniel Helft & Eliana
Raszewski, Argentina Supreme Court's Politics Play Into Ruling on Peso, (Mar. 10,
2003), available at http://quote.bloomberg.com ("'The judges on the court just operate
politically, ... . They were appointed because they are friends and accomplices of
[former President] Menem and their rulings have been contradictory and self-
serving."' (quoting Eduardo Barcesat, head of the Human Rights Department at the
University of Buenos Aires)). See also Paul Waldie, Argentina's Top Court Rules
Forced 'Pesofication' Illegal, GLOBE AND MAL, (Mar. 6, 2003), at http://www.
globeandmail.comservlet/ArticleNewsTPStory/LAC/20030306/RARGE/Business/Idx
("[An economist with Raymond James Argentina... said the ruling may have more
political than economic consequences. The country is holding elections . . . . [Then
current President] Mr. Duhalde tried to fight the ruling for fear that it would
endanger stability ahead of the .. .vote. But. . . others say the Supreme Court is
believed to be loyal to Mr. Duhalde's nemesis, former President Carlos Menem, a
leading candidate in the election.").
25. San Luis, Provincia de, _ FALLOS _ (Arg. CSJN Mar. 5, 2003), supra note 2.
The opinion refers specifically to ARG. CONST. art. 17, which provides that "[piroperty
may not be violated, and no inhabitant of the Nation can be deprived thereof except by
virtue of a sentence based on law. Expropriations in the public interest must be
authorized by law and previously compensated." See also ARG. CONST. art. 14 ("All
inhabitants of the Nation are entitled to... make use and dispose of their property.").
26. See, e.g., Perez, supra note 12, at 366.
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tineans to the courthouse steps to cheer the Court and to
denounce the nation's banks.27 Gleeful depositors announced that
"Iniever again in Argentina will the rights of citizens be trampled
on and that's what the Supreme Court has ruled."28 The Court's
new-found popularity might come at a price, however, if the gov-
ernment's dire predictions were to come to pass. Invalidating the
decree not only has the potential to reverse Argentina's recent eco-
nomic gains, it also could trigger a severe economic decline.29
This article offers one view on the causes and consequences of
the prongs of the Argentine Supreme Court's Morton's Fork. It
first will explore the roots of Argentina's latest economic crisis and
will review recent news and events. It next will provide a brief
history of the legal framework in which these events transpired,
including a discussion of Argentina's Constitution, its Supreme
Court, and the role of constitutional interpretation in a civil law
setting. The article finally will consider the Supreme Court's rul-
ing on the pesification decree and possible alternate scenarios
available to the Court and will ponder the risks and rewards asso-
ciated therewith.
II. THE ROOTS OF ARGENTINA'S CONTINUING CRISES
A. Argentina's Dramatic Beginnings
The roots of the Argentine Supreme Court's latest conundrum
lie deep within the nation's earliest history. Inherited Spanish
values influenced colonial Argentina and lingered long after
Argentina declared its independence from Spain in 1816.30 Castil-
ian society was characterized by an authoritarian monarch, an
ineffectual parliament, and a dominant church." In the highly
stratified society of colonial Argentina, the elite class supported
these inherited Castilian institutions. Because of these features
27. Argentina-Banks (Scheduled) Argentine depositors celebrate Supreme Court
ruling, (Mar. 5, 2003), at http://hoovnews.hoovers.com; Argentine High Court Nixes
Dollar Decree, (Mar. 5, 2003), at http://hoovnews.hoovers.com.
28. Argentina-Banks (Scheduled) Argentine depositors celebrate Supreme Court
ruling, supra note 27. As will be discussed in more detail infra, this declaration is
somewhat of an exaggeration regarding the holding in the case. The opinion did,
however, contain strong language on property rights. See San Luis, Provincia de, -
FALLOS __ (Arg. CSJN Mar. 5, 2003), supra note 2.
29. See Le Gras, Argentine Leader Says Court Ruling May Bring Chaos, supra
note 5.
30. See Banks & Carrio, supra note 3, at 8.
31. Id. at 7. See also Anne Proffitt Dupre, Transforming Education: The Lesson
From Argentina, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 1, 8 (2001).
396
2003] CRISIS IN ARGENTINA 397
and because Spanish-born officials governed colonial Argentina
exclusively, Argentina had no experience with, or real concept of,
self-governance or of a governmental system based upon separa-
tion of powers and checks and balances between various branches
of the government. 32 Within this hierarchy there existed a wide-
spread indifference to the rule of law and a longing for strong
leaders.3
Following its declaration of independence in 1816, 34 Argentina
experienced political turmoil, but that inherited Castilian institu-
tion, the authoritarian central Executive, survived, and thrived. 5
Even the drafters of the 1853 Constitution recognized the nation's
attachment to its caudillos,36 strong, charismatic rulers, by grant-
ing to the Executive very broad authority.37
Despite the adoption of a Constitution, Argentina continued
to suffer internal strife. In 1930, for the first time in the coun-
try's history, the elected government fell to a military coup.39 This
event "began a downward spiral from which Argentina has yet to
recover."40 Since 1930, the nation has experienced five military
coups, and, until Carlos Menem was elected in 1989, no civilian
President served a full term in office, 41 not even the popular and
charismatic Juan Peron.4 During this period, the Argentine peo-
32. Keith S. Rosenn, The Success of Constitutionalism in the United States and Its
Failure in Latin America: An Explanation, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 20-27
(1990) [hereinafter Rosenn, Latin American Constitutionalism].
33. See Banks & Carrio, supra note 3, at 64-65.
34. Paradoxically, the Argentine enthusiasm for an absolute and paternalistic
monarch led to the country's independence in 1816. See Banks & Carrio, supra note
3, at 8. "Creoles," Argentinean-born individuals of Spanish descent who were loyal to
the deposed King of Spain, Ferdinand VII, agitated for the wars of independence. See
Rosenn, Latin American Constitutionalism, supra note 32, at 21. These elite Creoles
refused to accept the rule of Napoleon's brother, Joseph, a mere commoner. Id. This
group was further incensed when Ferdinand, having returned to the throne, accepted
a liberal Constitution in 1812 and abolished the Inquisition. Id. Ferdinand's seeming
rejection of their traditional, conservative values inspired the Creoles to fight for their
independence. Id.
35. Banks & Carrio, supra note 3, at 9 ("Among all of the divisions which became
apparent in the first half of the nineteenth century, just about the only point upon
which the competing dominant groups agreed was that strong leaders were good and
necessary.").
36. See id. at 8.
37. See ARG. CONST. arts. 1-35.
38. Banks & Carrio, supra note 3, at 16-19.
39. Id. at 25.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Even those wholly unfamiliar with Argentina's history recognize Juan Peron
from the musical production Evita. This Andrew Lloyd Webber production
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ple were subjected not only to political instability, but also to eco-
nomic and social distress. This history seemingly has prevented
the Argentine citizenry from developing a respect for constitu-
tional rule.
B. President Menem and the Dollar Peg
Carlos Menem 43 was elected President of Argentina on May
14, 1989 during a period of extreme hyperinflation. 4' During the
1980's, dubbed the "Lost Decade of Development,"45 all of Latin
America, including Argentina, suffered a debt crisis that stag-
nated the region's economies. 41 In a bid to curtail the overwhelm-
ing inflation rates and to reverse a deepening recession, President
Menem's government instituted a series of economic reforms,
including the privatization of various state-owned enterprises, the
opening of the Argentine economy to foreign investment, and the
reduction of trade barriers.47 One of its most dramatic reforms
was to institute a Convertibility Law48 that fixed, or pegged, the
Argentine peso ("peso")49 to the United States dollar ("dollar" or
"U.S.$") at a one-to-one fixed exchange rate.50 This dollar peg ini-
tially was an enormous success; it helped tame the country's ram-
memorialized Peron's glamorous and popular wife. For details of Peron's life, see
JOSEPH A. PAGE, PERON, A BIOGRAPHY (1983). For a view of his ideology, see JuAN
DOMINGO PERON, LATINOAMERICA, AHoRA o NUNCA (1967).
43. Menem was a prisoner during Argentina's "Dirty War," the time period
between 1976-83 when the military ruled the country and thousands of Argentineans
disappeared or were detained, tortured, or killed without legal process. See Jordan
Stein, 25 Years and a Couple Blocks Away, at http://www.theglimpse.com/newsite/
viewarticle2.asp%3farticleid=72 (n.d.).
44. Basic Timeline: Argentina, at http://icg.harvard.edu/-ca4241/handouts/
ArgentinaTimeline.
45. Enrique R. Carrasco, Part One: Pursuing the Good Life: The Meaning of
Development as It Relates to the World Bank and the IMF, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 124 (1999) (part of a Symposium entitled, The E-Book on
International Finance and Development, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35
(1999)).
46. Id.
47. See Hearing on Argentina's Economic Crisis Before the Senate Subcomm. on
Int'l Trade and Fin., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of John B. Taylor, Under Sec'y of
the Treasury for Int'l Affairs) [hereinafter Statement of John B. Taylor].
48. C6D. Civ. art. 2459.
49. The austral actually was the Argentine currency when article 2459 was
enacted, and the law fixed the exchange rate at 10,000 austral per United States
dollar ("dollar" or "U.S.$"). The peso replaced the austral as Argentina's currency in
1992, and the pegged rate was one peso per one dollar. See, e.g., Caroline R. Hurtado,
Fiscal Policies as Decisive Solutions for Troubled Economies: Differing Legislative
Enactments in Argentina and Ecuador, 24 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 391, 418
n.144 (2002).
50. Id. at 406-08.
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pant inflation5 and stimulated growth.52 So successful was the
country's economic transformation that the IMF and other West-
ern financial institutions used Argentina as a poster child for
instituting their favored reform packages.53
A series of calamitous events in the 1990's, however, led
Argentina into a deep recession. 4 Within Argentina, budget defi-
cits began to increase and public debt began to rise as officials
failed to rein in profligate public spending.55 The country also
began to accumulate a trade deficit. The nation's Convertibility
Law, coupled with the appreciation of the dollar, made Argen-
tina's products more expensive, and exports fell precipitously.6
Further, Brazilian imports into Argentina soared when this
Argentine neighbor devalued its currency, the real, in part as a
response to the 1998-99 Asian financial crisis and its resulting
spread to Latin America. 7
C. Post-Menem Perils
On December 10, 1999, after President Menem departed the
executive office,58 Argentineans elected Fernando de la Rua as
51. Inflation in Argentina decreased from a staggering 5000 percent in 1989 to
less than five percent in 1994. Id. at 408.
52. See Statement of John B. Taylor, supra note 47.
53. See Larry Luxner, Ambassador of Argentina Diego Guelar: Overcoming the
Crisis, THE WASHINGTON DIPLOMAT, available at http://www.washdiplomat.com/02-04/
a8_02 04.html.
54. See Argentina Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Int'l Monetary Pol'y and
Trade, 107th Cong. (2002) (opening statement of the Hon. Doug Bereuter, Chairman,
House Subcomm. on Int'l Monetary Pol'y and Trade) [hereinafter Opening Statement
of Hon. Doug Bereuter].
55. Id. See also Statement of John B. Taylor, supra note 47.
56. See Opening Statement of Hon. Doug Bereuter, supra note 54.
57. See Roman Terrill, Part Three: Private Capital and Development: Challenges
Facing International Institutions in a Globalized Economy: VI: 1998/1999 Update:
The Asian Crisis Goes Global, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 325, 325 (1999)
(part of a Symposium entitled, The E-book on International Finance and Development,
9 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 35 (1999)).
58. Menem's exit, while a democratic one, was not particularly graceful. He
desperately wanted to serve a third term, but was constrained by the Constitution.
ARG. CONST. art. 90. Ironically, this provision was a product of Menem's own
ambition. The original constitutional term limit was a single six-year term. In order
to extend his own political life, Menem's Peronist Party and the Radical Party
negotiated the "Pacto de Olivos" that resulted in the Argentina Constitutional Reform
of 1994. This reform provided for four-year presidential terms, with the possibility of
one consecutive reelection. Despite this clear, and agreed, compromise, his supporters
insisted that the Constitution authorized Menem to seek a third term. For a
fascinating account of this drama, see Jonathan M. Miller, Evaluating the Argentine
Supreme Court under Presidents Alfonsin and Menem (1983-1999), VII Sw. J. L. &
TRADE Am. 369, 369-73 (2000) [hereinafter Miller II].
400 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3
their Executive. The new President faced a bleak state of eco-
nomic affairs. By the end of 2001, Argentina had debts totaling
U.S.$132 billion.59 The state of affairs degenerated even further
when the government's "zero deficit" policy failed to impose disci-
pline upon public spending.' As a result, Argentina's borrowing
rose sharply,61 and the IMF stopped releasing funds to Argentina
in December 2001 when the government failed to meet previously
agreed targets.2 President de la Rua announced that Argentina's
debt would have to be restructured, forcing Argentina into the
largest sovereign default in history."
While the restructuring effort was underway, uncertainty
prompted bank depositors to withdraw their funds, particularly
dollar-denominated funds, from Argentine banks, thereby threat-
59. See Opening Statement of Hon. Doug Bereuter, supra note 54.
60. See Statement of John B. Taylor, supra note 47. See also Manuel Pastor &
Carol Wise, From Poster Child to Basket Case, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Nov.-Dec. 2001, at
67.
61. See Statement of John B. Taylor, supra note 47.
62. See Argentina: More Chaos, supra note 9.
63. Id. Argentina's historical default once again focused attention on the
increasingly compelling need for institutional architecture to ensure the predictable
and orderly restructuring of unsustainable sovereign debt. See Augusto Lopez-
Claros, Issues in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, INST. FOR THE ECON. IN TRANSITION,
(June 20, 2002), at http://www.iet.ru/guest/lopez/20020614.htm. Sovereign debt crises
are not a new phenomenon. However, because of the greater integration of capital
markets, the complexity of debt work outs has increased exponentially. Sovereigns
now can access the capital markets in a range of jurisdictions, with a number of
sophisticated debt instruments and with a geographically and organizationally
diverse group of creditors. ANNE 0. KRUEGER, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, A
NEW APPROACH TO SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING 1 (2002). While the so-called
Paris and London Clubs offer a forum for rescheduling public sector debt, there is no
equivalent mechanism to restructure debt held by the private sector. See Lopez-
Claros, supra. Current procedures to handle sovereign defaults have been ad hoc, but
consensus has been building for an organized approach to the problem. See Martin
Wolf, Comment & Analysis: Debt to the World: The Crisis in Argentina Lends Support
to Calls for Better Sovereign Bankruptcy Procedures. But Reform of Debt
Restructuring is Long Overdue, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2002, available at http://www.ft.
com. Anne 0. Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the IMF, is one articulate
proponent of an improved process that she has nominated the Sovereign Debt
Restructuring Mechanism ("SDRM"). KRUEGER, supra. Only one of several ideas
being debated, the SDRM is patterned loosely upon U.S. domestic bankruptcy laws.
It seeks to incorporate into future debt contracts new contingency clauses that would
authorize binding super-majority decisionmaking by creditors; would permit the
sovereign to initiate the restructuring, with a standstill provision; and would describe
how creditors would engage with debtors. See Wolf, supra. The SDRM and other
proposals still are being debated, but both creditors and debtors appear to recognize
that reform is required to prevent what Anne Krueger has called the "unpalatable
choice between disruptive and potentially contagious unilateral default, or bailing out
private creditors and thereby contributing to moral hazard." Lopez-Claros, supra
(quoting Anne 0. Krueger).
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ening the nation's foreign currency reserves .64 Fearful of a col-
lapse of the banking system, President de la Rua issued a decree
that imposed restrictions on the amount of money that could be
withdrawn from banks.' These restrictions, referred to colloqui-
ally as the corralito,66 proved wildly unpopular. Not only did
thousands of Argentine savers petition the nation's courts to
declare the corralito unconstitutional,67 the restrictions also
sparked violent protests, during which some twenty-seven people
were killed.68 With Argentina on the verge of chaos, de la Rua
resigned as President on December 20, 2001.69
Over the next ten days, the Argentine Congress selected a
series of four interim presidents, including the final interim Exec-
utive, President Eduardo Duhalde.0 Argentina also declared a
moratorium on payment of nearly U.S.$95 billion-U.S.$115 billion
in commercial debt held by private investors,71 the largest ever
country default. One of President Duhalde's first actions was to
implement another round of economic reforms. This reform
package continued the suspension of public debt payments, main-
tained the corralito restrictions, ended the dollar peg, and deval-
ued the peso by twenty-nine percent.73
The Argentine Supreme Court complicated President
Duhalde's task when it ruled, on February 1, 2002, that the cor-
64. See Argentina Unveils Crisis Package, supra note 3.
65. Executive Decree 1570/01, B.O. (Arg.), 3 Dec. 2001. Decree 1570/01 limited
cash withdrawals to two hundred and fifty dollars per week per financial institution.
This forced Argentineans to utilize financial instruments such as checks or debit and
credit cards to conduct financial transactions.
66. Corralito translates into English as "little fence." See Valente, supra note 8.
67. See generally Argentina: More Chaos, supra note 9. Because Argentina does
not recognize class action lawsuits, savers must seek individual remedies. See
Argentine Lawmakers to Begin Judge Impeachment Process, Dow Jones Int'l News,
(Feb. 4, 2002), WL DJINS database.
68. Le Gras, Courts Threaten Argentina's Banks, supra note 1.
69. See Perez, supra note 12, at 362.
70. See New Man Takes Helm in Argentina, supra note 4.
71. See Argentina Blames IMF for Latest Debt Default, at http://www.dailytimes.
corn (last visited Nov. 18, 2002); see also Argentina Eases Freeze As Economy Warms
Up, FIN. TIMES, (Dec. 2, 2002), available at http://news.ft.com.
72. Matt Moffett & Michelle Wallin, Argentina Picks Peronist Duhalde as Fifth
President in Two Weeks, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2002, at A3. See also Opening Statement
of Hon. Doug Bereuter, supra note 54.
73. The Argentine Congress sanctioned President Duhalde's new reforms in Ley
25.561, B.O. (Arg.), 7 Jan. 2002. The President instituted a dual exchange rate
system that allowed the peso to float for financial transactions and fixed the peso's
value at 1.4 pesos to the dollar for foreign trade. See Opening Statement of Hon. Doug
Bereuter, supra note 54.
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ralito was unconstitutional.74 The Court ruled that the banking
restrictions violated Article 17 of the Argentine Constitution
because they ignored the right of individuals to dispose freely of
their assets.7' The Duhalde government immediately denounced
the decision as "politically motivated"76 and launched an impeach-
ment inquiry against the justices of the Court.77 The government
also declared a bank holiday to prevent a run on the banks,78 then
suspended all legal actions against the corralito for six months.79
Making yet another highly controversial move, President
Duhalde's government announced, on February 3, 2002, that all
bank deposits denominated in dollars would be "pesified," or con-
verted to pesos at the government-imposed rate of 1.4 pesos to the
dollar.8 ° Further, under the government's pesification plan, all
bank loans or other dollar debts would be converted into pesos at a
rate of one-to-one.81 Considering that the market exchange rate
was approximately two pesos to the dollar at this point in time,
74. Takko c. Freddo S.A., - FALLOS - (Arg. CSJN 2002), available at http://www.
estudiojbonicatto.com.ar/corralito/corraljuris/CSJN_020201.htm.
75. See Top Argentina Court Rules Bank Limits Illegal, Dow Jones Int'l News,
(Feb. 1, 2002), WL DJINS database. As noted supra note 25, ARG. CONST. art. 17
states that "[piroperty may not be violated, and no inhabitant of the Nation can be
deprived thereof except by virtue of a sentence based on law. Expropriations in the
public interest must be authorized by law and previously compensated."
76. See Argentina Court Faces Challenge, BBC News, (Feb. 2, 2002), at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1797868.stm.
77. Id. See also Opening Statement of Hon. Doug Bereuter, supra note 54;
Argentine Lawmakers to Begin Judge Impeachment Process, supra note 67; Argentina:
More Chaos, supra note 9; Press Attacks Supreme Court Decision, BBC News, (Feb. 2,
2002), at http://news .bbc.co .uk/2/hi/world/monitoring/media-reports/1798020.stm.
Some observers question whether the impeachment proceedings were instituted
solely in response to the Court's corralito ruling. As discussed infra Part III.D, the
threat of impeachment is somewhat of a constant for this Court. In fact, it has been
suggested that the Court's corralito ruling was a warning shot across the Duhalde
government's bow to prevent further impeachment inquiries. See generally Press
Attacks Supreme Court Decision, supra.
78. See Argentina Court Faces Challenge, supra note 76.
79. See Argentina: More Chaos, supra note 9. The Argentine government
announced in late March 2003 that it was lifting the unpopular corralito restrictions.
Tony Smith, Argentina Hopes for Rebound as Banking Freeze Ends, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., (Mar. 29, 2003), available at http://www.iht.com (last visited Apr. 2, 2003). It is
estimated that approximately sixteen billion pesos (U.S.$5.57 billion) were frozen in
the financial system. Id.
80. See Claudio Campuzano, Enron Nation: Only Recourse for Argentina May Be
An Authoritarian Government, WORLD TRIB., (Feb. 8, 2002), available at http:H/
216.26.163.62/2002/c02_07.html.
81. See also Opening Statement of Hon. Doug Bereuter, supra note 54. The San
Luis case did not address the constitutionality of the pesification of dollar-
denominated debt and loans. San Luis, Provincia de, - FALLOS - (Arg. CSJN Mar.
5, 2003), supra note 2.
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this forced conversion infuriated the Argentine middle class, who
immediately saw a steep drop in the value of their savings. 2 And,
while the pesification did help debtors by reducing the value of
their loans, creditors and banks suffered concomitant losses.
Constitutional challenges to the government's pesification
measures began to flood the lower courts, with mixed results. s3
When these cases began to reach it,84 the Supreme Court, how-
ever, did not rush to declare itself on the issue. Indeed, it cer-
tainly was aware of the public and governmental scrutiny.
Not content to await the Court's ruling, President Duhalde
and other officials went on the offensive, prognosticating publicly
that the nation could be plunged into anarchy should the Court
strike down the pesification measures.85 Their seemingly hyper-
bolic threats did not appear extreme in light of the country's eco-
nomic condition. Since the pesification decree, the peso had fallen
seventy-three percent against the dollar. 6 By August 1, 2002, the
value of the peso had dropped to four pesos to the dollar."7 Using
aggressive tactics, government lawyers at one point sought to dis-
qualify two members of the Court. The government also
82. See Campuzano, supra note 80.
83. Because the Argentine legal system does not have a general class action
procedural device, see supra note 2, the claims of individual depositors were being
analyzed in a myriad of lower courts, and these courts did not rule on the
constitutional issue consistently. See Carlos J. Colomba, Pesificacion: Panorama
Jurisprudencial, L.L. 4 (Arg. 2002).
84. Parties used the amparo procedural device to bring these cases to the Supreme
Court. This summary constitutional remedy may be brought against acts or
omissions of both public authorities and private parties that allegedly injure
constitutionally protected rights. See Keith S. Rosenn, Federalism in the Americas in
Comparative Perspective, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 1, 41 (1994) [hereinafter
Rosenn, Federalism in the Americas].
85. See Le Gras, Argentine Leader Says Court Ruling May Bring Chaos, supra
note 5. See also Campuzano, supra note 80.
86. See Le Gras, Courts Threaten Argentina's Banks, supra note 1.
87. See Doug Casey, What's Next For Argentina, (Aug. 1, 2002), http://www.
worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=28481. The peso has since
stabilized at approximately 2.81 - 3.3 pesos to the dollar. See, e.g., Rohter, Policy on
Peso is Overturned in Argentina, supra note 6.
88. See Rohter, Policy on Peso is Overturned in Argentina, supra note 6. The
government claimed that one member of the Court had improperly disclosed publicly
that he would vote against the decree. The other justice had a conflict, in the
government's view, because he previously had held dollar deposits in an Argentine
bank. This justice sought to recuse himself from the pesification deliberations. Yet
another justice even resigned his seat on the court. See Eliana Raszewski & Daniel
Helft, Argentina Appoints Senate President Maqueda to Supreme Court, (Dec. 27,
2002), available at http://quote.bloomberg.com. This justice, Justice Gustavo Bossert,
resigned in October 2002, stating that he was "tired of being accused of corruption for
not supporting government policies." Id.
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appointed the president of the Argentine Senate, an attorney and
a member of the ruling Peronist party, to fill an open seat on the
Court."9
Against this tumultuous backdrop, Argentina struggled to
negotiate a much-needed loan package with the IMF. Before
wresting a grudging interim rescheduling of its repayments from
the Fund,9 Argentina defaulted on its payment commitments to
the World Bank.9' In December 2002, Argentine officials
announced that Argentina was suspending future payments on
the World Bank debt,92 further isolating itself from the interna-
tional financial community. Despite its pique for the Supreme
Court, the Duhalde administration even abandoned its impeach-
ment efforts against the justices at the urging of the international
financial community, which demanded political consensus in the
89. See Raszewski & Helft, Argentina Appoints Senate President Maqueda to
Supreme Court, supra note 88. Press reports claim that this appointment will make
the Court friendlier to the Duhalde administration and its economic reforms. See id.
90. See Argentina, IMF Agree On Loan, (Jan. 24, 2003), at http://money.cnn.com/
2003/01/24/news/international/argentina (last visited Jan. 24, 2003). Not everyone is
pleased with the transitional agreement. The interim deal only defers the U.S.$6.8
billion due to the IMF through August of 2003, allowing Argentina to hold elections in
April 2003 without falling further behind on payments. Argentina complains that the
IMF has been "hostile" and has not helped the nation in its time of need. See Mark
Drajem & Helen Murphy, Debt-laden Argentina Given IMF Reprieve, (Jan. 25, 2003),
http://www. miami. com/ mld / miamiherald/ 2003/ 1/25 /business / 5026532. htm. Con-
versely, resentful sources at the IMF claim that Argentina played a blatant, and dan-
gerous, game of "chicken" with the Fund in order to secure debt relief. See Argentina
Will Get Its Roll-Over, But Some At The IMF Are Unhappy, (Jan. 23, 2003), http://
www.bdfm.co.za/cgi-bin/pp-print.pl. Argentina has, according to IMF officials, broken
most of the codes of conduct of international finance and used the threat of default
with the IMF and the World Bank to "blackmail" the institution into extending its
debt obligations. Id. Some strongly believe that the IMF's acquiescence to the Argen-
tina rollover deal undermines the Fund's credibility on debt repayment with delin-
quent borrowers. Id. This is a credible claim considering that, since Argentina
entered the IMF, it has negotiated nineteen agreements with the funding agency,
fifteen of which have failed. See EFE News Service: Argentina-Economy: Economy
Minister Says Argentina Reached "Realistic" Deal With IMF, (Jan. 17, 2003), at http:/
hoovnews.hoovers.com.
91. See Argentina's Financial Crisis: What is the Solution, supra note 10. On
November 14, 2002, Argentina did make a partial payment of U.S.$79 million to the
World Bank. See Press Release No.: 2002/140/LCR, World Bank, Argentina Makes
Partial Payment, World Bank Confirms, (Nov. 14, 2002), at http'//www.worldbank.
org.
92. See Argentina Won't Repay $726M to World Bank, (Dec. 13, 2002), at http://
hoovnews.hoovers.com. However, after it finally reached an agreement with the IMF
to reschedule its repayments to that institution, Argentina made critical payments to
the World Bank and to the Inter-American Development Bank that will allow these
two entities to resume lending to the impoverished nation. See Argentina, IMF Agree
On Loan, supra note 90.
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country as a condition to any additional aid.93 Before its IMF
reprieve, Argentina's default threatened to cut off one of the
nation's last sources of funding and would have placed it in the
company of such countries as Somalia and pre-Operation Iraqi
Freedom Iraq.94
In 2002, the nation registered a staggering forty-one percent
inflation rate, and government officials warned that, even if the
Supreme Court were to issue a positive ruling on pesification,
Argentina would be bankrupt by May 2003 if it did not obtain
outside financial assistance. 95
Meanwhile, there appeared to be no end in sight to the plight
of the Argentine people. On December 20, 2002, thousands
marked the first anniversary of the violent protests that ended the
Presidency of Fernando de la Rua.' Official unemployment is
now at a near-record seventeen percent, although most economists
say it is closer to twenty-five percent, 97 and the poverty rate has
climbed to sixty percent of the population.
III. ARGENTINA'S LEGAL TEMPLATE
A. The Constitution: An Enduring Document
Argentina's Constitution, first drafted in 1853,99 is the second
oldest constitution in the Americas. 100 The drafters were strongly
influenced by the U.S. Constitution, and the Constitution of
Argentina guarantees a list of civil, social, and political rights far
more extensive than the relatively tersely worded protections set
forth in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights. 101 It also deviates
93. See Argentina Ditches Bid to Impeach Judges, supra note 16.
94. See Argentina: World Bank Extends Loan Deadline, (Nov. 3, 2002), at http: fl
www.money.iwon.com/jsp/nw/nwdt-rt.jsp?cat=USMARKET&src=201&feed=reu&
section=newsid=reu-n0360010&date=20021103&alias=/alias/money/cm/nw. These
countries are among the most economically isolated nations in the world.
95. See Argentina Warns of Bankruptcy Threat, at http:/www.cnn.com/2002/
World/Americas/11/21/argentina.economy.ap/index.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2002).
Argentina finally did receive this critical outside funding. See supra notes 90-92.
96. See Protests Mark Argentine Anniversary, BBC News, (Dec. 20, 2002), at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americasf2592661.stm.
97. Associated Press, Menem Forces Run-Off in Argentina, (Apr. 28, 2003),
available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk.
98. Larry Rohter, Old and New Argentina Headed for a Runoff Vote, INT'L.
HERALD TRIB., (Apr. 29, 2003), available at http://www.iht.com.
99. See Garay, supra note 22, at 162.
100. Dupre, supra note 31, at 8.
101. See Banks & Carrio, supra note 3, at 12-13. Several of these guarantees are
aspirational in nature and are virtually unenforceable. See Rosenn, Latin American
Constitutionalism, supra note 32, at 26. For example, Article 19 of the Argentine
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from the U.S. model by retaining the Spanish colonial emphasis
on the centralization of power. °2
A remarkably enduring and flexible document, the Argentine
Constitution was relatively stable during most of the period from
1860 through 1994.' ° However, its endurance faced challenges
between 1930 and 1983 when Argentina experienced a number of
military coups. 104 While the Supreme Court's apparent judicial
approval of these political revolts may have averted further social
unrest, it certainly did not encourage constitutional respect
amongst the Argentine public.0 5 Despite this seeming disregard
for its content, the Constitution has remained in force, at least
nominally, until today, with the exception of the enactment of a
Peronist constitution during Juan Peron's Presidency between
1949 and 1956.16
Maintaining its relevance throughout Argentina's history,
and occupying the central position in Argentina's legal hierarchy,
the Constitution was revised extensively in 1994 to even more
strongly emphasize economic and social rights. ' 7 This author
argues, however, that the Constitution, while an exceptional and
durable text, has suffered from situational interpretation in the
hands of the Argentine judiciary.
Constitution states in part that the private actions of men which in no way offend
public order or morality, nor injure a third party, are only reserved to God and are
exempt from the authority of judges. ARG. CONST. art. 19.
102. See Banks & Carrio, supra note 3, at 13.
103. See Miller, supra note 12, at 81.
104. See Banks & Carrio, supra note 3, at 25. Since a military coup in 1930 toppled
the elected government, there have been five more military coups in Argentina. Id.
105. Following a military coup in 1930, the Argentine Supreme Court was asked to
rule upon the legitimacy of the new military government. Facing yet another
Morton's Fork, the Court declared that de facto the new government was capable of
carrying out the tasks of an elected government, thereby recognizing the legality of
the military regime despite its unconstitutional origin. See Decree of Sept. 10, 158
FALLOs 290 (Arg. CSJN 1930). This de facto doctrine granted the government legal
sanction on the basis of "necessity" and "public policy." See id. For an interesting
discussion of how a constitutionally elected government should treat de facto laws,
see Tim Dockery, The Rule of Law over the Law of Rulers: The Treatment of De Facto
Laws in Argentina, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1578 (1996). See also Banks & Carrio,
supra note 3, at 27-28.
106. More Information on . . . the Argentine Constitution of 1994, at http://www.
hrcr.org/chart/annotations&references/Argentina.html.
107. Id. The 1994 amendments to the Constitution incorporated a number of
ratified human rights treaties and other such accords, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, elevating these documents to constitutional status in
Argentina. Id.
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B. The Evolution of the Supreme Court
The fortunes of the La Corte Suprema de Justicia de la
Naci6n are susceptible to the political winds that have swept
Argentina since its earliest beginnings. In the nation's infancy,
the executive branch established its dominance over the judici-
ary."°8 Despite a constitutional guarantee of virtual lifetime ten-
ure pending good behavior,0 9 the Court has been wholly or
partially restructured on seven different occasions."0 For exam-
ple, each coup d'etat and the corresponding return to democracy
generally have been followed by the removal or resignation of the
justices of the Court and the appointment of new members."'
Some trace the disrepair of Argentina's judicial institutions to
the country's Peronist past. Prior to Juan Peron's administration,
the justices of the Supreme Court enjoyed long, constitutionally
protected tenures, undisturbed by political interference."' How-
ever, since Peron's first administration, beginning in 1946,
Supreme Court justices average only twelve years on the bench."3
Peron rose to power through the military government, a gov-
ernment that frequently clashed with the nation's Supreme Court
on many issues, including individual political and property
rights."4 Peron's government began impeachment proceedings
against the Court in 1946, voting to remove the justices in 1947."'
Since Peron's Presidency, virtually every civilian President of
Argentina has been able to choose a majority of the members of
the Supreme Court early in his term."6
Since 1960, the average tenure of a Supreme Court justice in
108. See Banks & Carrio, supra note 3, at 16.
109. Article 110 of the Argentine Constitution provides that justices of the Supreme
Court and lower courts shall hold office as long as they maintain their good conduct
and shall receive a compensation for their services that shall be determined by law
and that cannot be diminished in any way during their tenure. ARG. CONST. art. 110.
110. See Garay, supra note 22, at 189.
111. Id. This occurred in 1955, 1966, and 1976.
112. See Brink Lindsey, How Argentina Got Into This Mess, at http://www.cato.org/
research. See also Miller, supra note 12, at 152-61.
113. See Lindsey, supra note 112.
114. See Miller, supra note 12, at 153-62.
115. All of the members of the Court were charged except for a recent appointee
who largely favored the ideals of the Peronist movement. The bill of impeachment
raised numerous issues, but it accused the Court broadly of exceeding the judicial
function with political improprieties and prejudice against labor. Id. at 155-61.
116. Id. See also Lindsey, supra note 112 ("After Peron (he left the Presidency for
the second time in 1974), five of 17 presidents named every member of the court
during their term, a distinction that had previously been limited to Bartolom6 Mitre,
the country's first constitutional president . .. ").
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Argentina has declined to below four years,117 and the Court basi-
cally has served at the whim of the government in power. The
1966 and 1976 military takeovers in the nation resulted in the
summary dismissal of the entire Court."8 The return of democ-
racy to Argentina in 1983 once again resulted in the complete
replacement of the Supreme Court membership." 9
A striking example of another civilian President engaging in
such a wholesale purge occurred in 1990. Then President Menem
successfully packed the Court by increasing its membership from
five to nine. 2 ° As a vacancy already existed on the Court and as
one Justice resigned in protest, Menem succeeded in appointing
six of his close allies and political supporters to the new nine-
member Court. 121 The Menem administration openly expressed its
opinion that every Argentine President over the previous fifty
years "had" his own Supreme Court, and a Court that is out of line
with the policies of the Executive would cause instability.'22 Since
Menem's Presidency, the situation of the Court has only
declined. 2 3 It remains to be seen whether its pesification ruling
will restore the public's confidence in the Court on a sustained
basis.
C. The Court's Constitutional Jurisprudence
In Colonial Spanish America, and prior to the adoption of a
Civil Code in Argentina, separation of powers did not exist, and
functional appellate judges, known as judges of the colonial
audencias, were members of the Crown bureaucracy.'24  The
Spanish Crown promulgated much of the law for its Argentine col-
ony, and these laws often were confusing, contradictory, and
largely unavailable to the populace.'25 This resulted in a "highly
117. See Lindsey, supra note 112.
118. See Keith S. Rosenn, The Protection of Judicial Independence in Latin
America, 19 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 1, 27 (1988) [hereinafter Rosenn, Protection
of Judicial Independence].
119. Id.
120. Ley 23.774, A.D.L.A. 1256 (Arg. 1990), B.O. (Arg.), 16 Apr. 1990. See also
Miller, supra note 12, at 151-52.
121. Miller, supra note 12, at 152. See also Perez, supra note 12, at 359; Lindsey,
supra note 112. For example, one of these new justices reportedly was Menem's law
partner. See Helft & Raszewski, Argentina Supreme Court's Politics Play Into Ruling
on Peso, supra note 24.
122. See Miller, supra note 12, at n.377.
123. See discussion infra Part III.D. For an enlightening account of the Court's loss
of authority, see Miller II, supra note 58, at 369-76, 394-433.
124. See Miller, supra note 12, at 99-103.
125. See Rosenn, Latin American Constitutionalism, supra note 32, at 25.
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unpredictable and personal legal system" in which judges enjoyed
virtually unfettered discretion.'26 These judges routinely consid-
ered the interests of the Crown when interpreting the widely scat-
tered and diversely derived legal norms, including societal
perceptions of fairness.'27
Argentina's declaration of political independence in 1816 and
its adoption of a Constitution in 1863 altered the legal landscape.
Modeled upon its U.S. counterpart, the Argentine Constitution
established an "independent" judiciary with the authority to hear
and decide all cases arising under the Constitution.'28 The early
Supreme Court drew upon U.S. constitutional principles and
jurisprudence as strong authority for its interpretation of the
Argentine Constitution. This U.S. authority, however, was merely
persuasive, and reference thereto inconsistent.
Prior to and following these events, Argentina's legal culture
clearly identified with the civil law tradition. 29 This tradition
coexists uneasily with the U.S constitutional jurisprudential
model. Civil law courts are bound only by enacted Constitutions,
codes, statutes, or decrees. The Anglo-American doctrine of stare
decisis is not applicable in a civil law setting. Very generally
speaking, countries subscribing to the civil law tradition recognize
jurisprudencia, or precedents, as a persuasive, rather than a bind-
ing, source of authority. Prior decisions in like-cases assist judges
in responding to legal problems, but courts are not constrained to
follow these decisions. Instead, they may adopt alternate ratio-
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. ARG. CONST. arts. 100-01. This independence, however, has proved illusory,
perhaps due to Argentina's caudillo tradition of dominant Executives and its
tumultuous political and economic reality. In a thoughtful article, Professor Keith S.
Rosenn explores the definition of the oft-used term "judicial independence." See
Rosenn, Protection of Judicial Independence, supra note 118. Professor Rosenn
begins his analysis with Professor Theodore Becker's commonly cited proposal that
'judicial independence is (a) the degree to which judges believe they can decide and do
decide consistent with their own personal attitudes, values, and conceptions of the
judicial role (in their interpretation of the law), (b) in opposition to what others, who
have or are believed to have political or judicial power, think about or desire in like
matters, and (c) particularly when a decision adverse to the beliefs or desires of those
with political or judicial power may bring some retribution on the judges personally or
on the power of the Court.' Id. at 4. He then further refines this definition and
elaborates on the desirability of such a proposition. Id. at 7. For another erudite
analysis of the concept of judicial independence, see Thomas E. Plank, The Essential
Elements of Judicial Independence and the Experience of Pre-Soviet Russia, 5 WM. &
MARY BILL RTs. J. 1 (1996).
129. See Garay, supra note 22, at 185.
2003] 409
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3
nales, so long as they are not incoherent or capricious.13°
Despite its civil law roots, the early Argentine Supreme Court
appeared to embrace U.S. constitutional cases as genuine inter-
pretations of the Argentine Constitution, accumulating decisions
that were applied as authority for subsequent rulings. 3' The
Court's initial approach to constitutional interpretation can be
summarized by its statement that it would be extremely inconve-
nient if precedents were not duly considered and consequently fol-
lowed, consistent with the civil law doctrine of jurisprudencia
constante. 1
32
However, a close examination of the Court's cases reveals that
it has failed strictly to apply its relevant precedents. 3 3 Beginning
in the 1930's, the Court experienced a sort of philosophical conver-
sion134 that led it to drift away from its rational approach to consti-
tutional interpretation 33 toward a more expansive view of the
constitutional text.3 ' Responding to significant social changes,
the Court began to look beyond the four corners of the document
itself, conceptualizing the Constitution as a "'political instrument
endowed with extreme flexibility to adapt itself to all times and all
future circumstances. '
37
This adjudicative inconsistency is strikingly illustrated in the
Court's case law on legislative activity affecting commerce. By
way of background, the Argentine Constitution protects freedom
of commercial activity in a more explicit manner than does its U.S.
counterpart. Its Article 14 provides that "[a]ll the inhabitants of
130. For a more detailed description of the civil law tradition, see generally CVIL
LAw (Ralf Rogowski ed. 1996). See also A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM (Fed.
Judicial Ctr. 1995).
131. See Garay, supra note 22, at 185-86.
132. Id. at 187-88 (paraphrasing Baretta c. Provincia de Cordoba, 183 FALLOS 409
(Arg. CSJN 1939)). Jurisprudencia constante represents the continuum of stable and
settled rules.
133. Id.
134. See, e.g., id. at 193.
135. The descriptive phrase "a discourse of rationality" has been coined to describe
such inconsistent jurisprudence. Cf. Frederick E. Snyder, State of Siege and Rule of
Law in Argentina: The Politics and Rhetoric of Vindication, 15 LAw. OF THE AM. 503,
518 (1984). "That the courts have on occasion rendered decisions restraining the
government and protecting individual rights may have served only to establish what
Frederick Snyder calls a 'discourse of rationality.'" Banks & Carrio, supra note 3, at
30. Similarly, these two authors argue that, in the context of the governmental
exercise of emergency powers, the Argentine Supreme Court has "abdicated its
responsibility to measure official conduct against legal norms." Id. at 28.
136. See Miller, supra note 12, at 110-51.




the Nation are entitled to the following rights . . ., namely ... to
use and dispose of their property ... "138 The Constitution's Arti-
cle 17 further provides that "[piroperty may not be violated, and
no inhabitant of the nation may be deprived of it, except by virtue
of a judgment based on law. Expropriation for reasons of public
interest must be authorized by law and previously
compensated.
1 39
Until 1930, the Argentine Supreme Court's interpretation of
these terms matched the clarity of the language itself.14 ° During
this time, the Court strictly protected private economic rights
against a wide variety of regulations. After 1930, however, the
case law changed, and the Court allowed virtually unlimited gov-
ernmental regulation of the economy.' As the country suffered
the effects of the Great Depression, the Argentine Court adopted a
more tolerant view of governmental interference with economic
activity. The Court's new "responsive" approach to constitutional
interpretation recognized that societal needs could influence the
judicial function and allowed the Court to approve governmental
measures designed to respond to the country's economic
emergency. 142
Since it began responsively interpreting the Constitution in
the 1930s, the Court found that numerous interventionist eco-
nomic programs passed constitutional muster. Unfortunately, the
country has suffered a continuing series of economic crises, and
most of these measures were implemented during states of emer-
gency. For example, in 1990, in the much-debated and "politically
crucial"13 Peralta c. Nacion Argentina, a ruling that is particu-
larly relevant to the government's recent pesification decree, the
Court upheld a presidential decree'" that converted bank
accounts over a certain value into long-term government bonds.'45
At the time, the Argentine government was facing a declaration of
insolvency or a massive devaluation, and the bond conversion was
138. ARG. CONST. art. 14.
139. ARG. CONST. art. 17.
140. See Miller, supra note 12, at 134-43 (discussing and citing a number of
representative cases pertaining to economic regulation during this era, including the
seminal Hileret c. Provincia de Tucuman, 98 FALLOs 20 (Arg. CSJN 1903)).
141. Id. at 131.
142. Id. at 143-52.
143. Miller II, supra note 58, at 400.
144. Presidential Decree No. 36/90, 2 E.D.L.A. 11 (Arg. 1990).
145. Peralta c. Nacion Argentina, 313 FALLOS 1513 (Arg. CSJN 1990). For a
discussion of the Peralta case, see Miller II, supra note 58, at 400.
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its last resort.148 Despite the obvious questions concerning the
constitutionality of this forced conversion, the Court found that,
while the government's emergency powers are limited to situa-
tions of dire necessity, the bond conversion measure was propor-
tionally tailored to address the particular economic necessity. "7
As previously discussed, the most recent economic crisis also
has engaged the Court. In one of the first cases to reach the Court
on the issue of the corralito, the Court seemingly approved the
unpopular governmental banking controls, invalidating a prelimi-
nary injunction ordering various banks to release frozen funds
and ordering one plaintiff to redeposit funds already removed. 148
Shortly after this first review, the Court again suspended similar
preliminary injunctions allowing cash withdrawals.4 9 However,
in a surprising move, the Court acknowledged the possibility that
the controls could be constitutionally invalid.5 ° This possibility
came to pass in the Takko c. Freddo S.A. 5' ruling, in which the
Court held that the corralito banking controls were
unconstitutional.
The Takko c. Freddo S.A. decision seemingly ignored prior,
and even very recent, precedents, such as Peralta c. Nacion Argen-
tina. Disregarding the striking similarities, the Court in Takko
did not even attempt to distinguish Peralta c. Nacion Argentina or
to justify the dissimilar results, except to summarily declare that
the corralito was unreasonable, while the Peralta bond conversion
was reasonable. 152
The Court's opinion declaring the pesification decree to be
unconstitutional continues this trend.'53 Query, however, whether
these abrupt about-faces actually herald the Court's return to
legal rationalism, a text-based approach to constitutional inter-
pretation, or whether they are, as some vehemently insist, a politi-
cally calculated stab at the Executive.'
146. See Miller II, supra note 58, at 400.
147. Peralta, 313 FALLOS at 1552 (Arg. CSJN 1990).
148. La Corte Suprema sali6 a sostener el corralito, CLARIN, (Dec. 29, 2001),
Economia, available at http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/2001-12-29/e-01601.htm.
149. Silvia Boschi, La Corte emiti6 un nueva fallo en favor del corralito financiero,
CLARIN, (Jan. 9, 2002), Economia, available at http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/2002-
01-09/e-00401.htm.
150. Id.
151. Takko, __ FALLOS - (Arg. CSJN 2002), supra note 74. See also Banco de
Galicia y Buenos Aires (Carlos Smith) c. P.E.N., L.L. 768 (Arg. CN Com. 2002).
152. Takko, __ FALLOS _, supra note 74. See also Perez, supra note 12, at 368-70.
153. San Luis, Provincia de, - FALLOS - (Arg. CSJN Mar. 5, 2003), supra note 2.
154. See supra note 24. See also David DeRosa, Currency Missteps Haunt
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A number of causes have been cited for the Court's unpredict-
able doctrinal shifts from an autonomous, text-based approach to
interpreting the text of the Constitution to one that is more
responsive. Personnel changes clearly have influenced all of the
Court's jurisprudence, 155 as has political instability, a cause of
Court personnel changes not attributable to normal attrition.
158
One commentator intriguingly suggests that, while it might
appear implausible, jurisprudential inconsistencies might be due
to the Court's lack of familiarity with its own prior decisions.
Amazingly, until 1990, the Court's jurisdiction was mandatory,
and it decided an astounding average of four thousand cases per
year.157
Another possible explanation of the Court's inconsistent
application of prior case law might lie in Argentina's adoption of
the Civil Code in 1869. The role of the judiciary changed dramati-
cally, if gradually, with codification. The structure of the new
Code virtually eliminated judicial discretion. Thus restrained,
Argentine judges began mechanically performing legal exegesis,
deferring to the Executive and approaching their tasks as mere
technicians. This legal mentality informed the Court's constitu-
tional jurisprudence until its experiment with responsiveness.5 8
Evolving societal attitudes and conditions also are undeniable
extra-constitutional influences on the judicial function. Courts
operate smoothly in times of relative stability and calm, 159 but
Argentine courts have not had the luxury of existing in such a cli-
mate. The nation has, in the words of one scholarly text, "stum-
bled from crisis to crisis[,]160 with concomitant legal challenges
and crises. Faced with complex and often competing societal
demands, arguments based upon national security and emergency
Argentina, (Mar. 14, 2003), available at http://www.bloomberg.com ("Interestingly,
[then Argentine President] Duhalde's people are spinning the court's actions [in the
pesification case] to say that the judiciary is playing politics, trying to discredit the
government by destroying what is left of Argentina's battered economy. They say this
favors former President Carlos Menem's chances of defeating Duhalde['s hand-picked
successor] in the election. And leave no doubt about it, Menem is out front and center
in favor of the court's ruling.").
155. For example, the appointment of Antonio Bermejo to the Court in 1903
augured a "generational shift" in the Court's mentality. See Miller, supra note 12, at
112.
156. For a discussion of the Court's turbulent restructuring in the wake of political
upheaval, see supra Part III.
157. Garay, supra note 22, at 188.
158. Cf. Miller, supra note 12, at 112.
159. Cf. Miller II, supra note 58.
160. See Banks & Carrio, supra note 3, at 69.
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conditions have influenced the Argentine Supreme Court, often
overwhelming even explicit constitutional limitations.'
As sympathetic as one might be to the Court's "responsive"
approach to constitutional mandates in times of crisis, serious
questions arise from the Court's uneven jurisprudential con-
tinuity."2 One might well ask whether the Court's interpreta-
tional inconsistencies undermine the legitimacy of the Court
itself, its constitutional adjudications, and, at the risk of appear-
ing histrionic, perhaps even the very concept of a binding written
Constitution. For, if the highest judicial authority in Argentina
ignores the text of the Constitution and decisions interpreting
that document, need the executive and legislative branches of the
government be constrained by its text?163
D. The Court: Perception and Reality
Unlike the prestige and standing accorded by the U.S. public
to our Supreme Court," the Argentine citizenry appears to lack
confidence in the institutional legitimacy of that nation's high
Court.165 Prior to the Court's pesification ruling, a public opinion
poll reported that eighty-eight percent of Argentineans had a neg-
ative view of the judiciary. 16" Another such poll calculated that
two thirds of respondents viewed the Argentine Court as
politicized and lacking independence from the Executive.'67
Nearly the same number considered the Court to be "very corrupt'
or 'corrupt', and a plurality of forty-seven percent even con-
161. Id. at 76. See also Miller II, supra note 58, at 426. ("There is no question that
the Menem Court faced some enormous public pressures that would have hurt any
Court.").
162. Cf. Miller II, supra note 58, at 427 ("The simplest explanation for what
happened is one of crude politics and personal loyalties.").
163. See generally Garay, supra note 22, at 201-02.
164. The U.S. Supreme Court is not wholly immune from critical scrutiny.
Consider the pubic outcry following that Court's ruling in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000). That decision left many observers with "the overwhelming impression [that]
the Court [acted] as a partisan institution." Michael Herz, The Supreme Court in
Real Time: Haste, Waste, and Bush v. Gore, 35 AKRON L. REV. 185, 193 (2002). "If the
Court accelerates its ordinary processes in order to solve a political crisis, it will
inescapably be perceived as deciding on political grounds, for that is how political
problems are decided. Not only was the Court in Bush v. Gore ruling on a political
battle, it had become a participant in that battle. The usual insulation and distance
had evaporated." Id. at 194.
165. See Helft & Raszewski, Argentina Supreme Court's Politics Play Into Ruling
on Peso, supra note 24 ("The public perception of judges among Argentines is also at
an all-time low.").
166. Id.
167. Miller, supra note 12, at 151-52.
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sider[ed] the Court institutionally 'obsolete.""'
The international community had a similarly low opinion of
the Argentine judiciary.169 In a survey of ninety-one countries,
Argentina ranked fifty-fourth in the independence of judiciary cat-
egory, fifty-fifth in litigation costs, and forty-fifth for corruption in
the legal system.7 °
In Argentina, this simmering resentment of the judiciary
reached the boiling point when a Court decision resulted in the
dismissal of charges against former President Menem on charges
of illegal arms trafficking.' 7 ' The Court's initial decision in favor
of the corralito further enraged the public, making the Court the
subject of street protests. Astoundingly, protestors threw rocks
and eggs at the homes of individual justices to demonstrate their
dissatisfaction with the state of the judiciary in general, and with
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in particular.'72
The Court's pesification ruling appears to have mollified its
critics for the moment. Crowds cheered the ruling and hailed the
Court as a protector of private property rights.7 3 Not everyone is
convinced, however, that the Court's motivations were pure.'74
These critics and others perceive the current Supreme Court
168. Id. at 152 (quoting Christopher Larkins, The Judiciary and Delegative
Democracy in Argentina, 30 COMP. POL. 423, 424 (1998)). In a footnote, Miller cites
polling data indicating that only 12.7 and 14.6 percent of Argentineans had a positive
image of the judiciary and that the Supreme Court was the institution that most
frustrated the public as compared to Congress, the police, the Catholic Church, and
other political and cultural institutions. Miller, supra note 12, at 152 n.366.
169. See Lindsey, supra note 112. This article cites the 2000 Global
Competitiveness Report co-produced by Harvard University and the World Economic
Forum. This Report surveys business leaders from over four thousand firms in fifty-
nine countries on their perceptions of business conditions in various nations. The
article also references Transparency International's index of corruption levels, which
surveys the business community, academics, and risk analysts.
170. Id.
171. Alejandro Carrio, The Argentine Supreme Court Ruled "There Are No Crimes"
and Former President Menem Walked Away: That's What Friends Are For, 8 Sw. L. J.
TRADE AM. 271, 276 (2001-2002).
172. La protesta no para: Cacerolazo de Tibunales al Congreso, CLARIN, (Jan. 18,
2002), Politica, available at http://www.clarin.com.ar/diario/2002-01-18/p-337443.
htm.
173. See, e.g., Waldie, supra note 24.
174. See supra note 24. See also Enrique Medina & Kevin Hall, Argentine Court
Rules Unconstitutional Forced Conversion of Dollar Bank Accounts into Local
Currency, (Mar. 5, 2003), available at http://www.thestate.commld/thestate/news/
world/5323181.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2003) ("The decision was a blow to
[Argentina's then] President Duhalde, who days before the ruling accused the judges,
mostly appointed by his rival, former President Carlos Menem, of 'wanting to
govern.'"). See also supra notes 24, 154.
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to be one of the weakest in Argentine history.'75 However, one
may question whether this perception reflects the Court's reality.
Consider the following data on the qualifications'76 and experience
of the Argentine justices. Between 1862 and 1946, forty-one
judges served on the Supreme Court. 177 Twelve of these justices,
or twenty-nine percent, previously had served as Cabinet Minis-
ters. 78 Additionally, eight justices, or twenty percent of the forty-
one, had served as provincial governors. 179 Twenty-eight of these
justices, or sixty-eight percent, had been members of one or both
Houses of Congress. 8 ° In contrast, none of the sixty-one justices
who served on the Court since 1947 was a Cabinet member, and
only two had experience in the Congress.' 8'
Several reasons may account for this apparent decline in judi-
cial quality. First, the Court's waning prestige may have made
the position less desirable. Also, despite a constitutional guaran-
tee against reducing or diminishing judicial salaries,'82 salaries for
Argentine judges are chronically low. 1 83 The country's inflation on
occasion has so reduced the real economic value of judicial salaries
that restaurant servers in Buenos Aires earned more than the
President of the Supreme Court. 8 4
In addition, consider also the inference that there may prove
to be a causal relationship between the Court's constitutional
interpretive inconsistencies and its declining prestige. 85 Relevant
to this issue are two, seemingly contradictory, themes that emerge
175. Miller, supra note 12, at 153-54. See also Miller II, supra note 58, at 430.
"Never, ever in Argentine history have we had such a politicized Supreme Court.'"
(quoting an Argentine constitutional lawyer). Helft & Raszewski, Argentina Supreme
Court's Politics Play Into Ruling on Peso, supra note 24 ("The public perception of
judges among Argentines is also at an all-time low."). Id.
176. "The qualifications of some of the members of this [Supreme C]ourt are
appalling and without simple political calculation they would have never made it to
such an important position." See Helft & Raszewski, Argentina Supreme Court's
Politics Play Into Ruling on Peso, supra note 24 (quoting an Argentine constitutional
lawyer).




181. Id. Americans, recognized as having a somewhat cynical view of politics, may
question whether political service qualifies one for the bench. In Argentina, cynicism
aside, national political candidates generally are drawn from the very well educated,
many of whom are internationally renowned intellectuals.
182. ARG. CONST. art. 110, supra note 109.
183. See Rosenn, Protection of Judicial Independence, supra note 118, at 29.
184. Id.
185. For a discussion of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence, see supra Part
III.C.
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from the public debate surrounding the Court. First, there has
been and continues to be broad public support for textually uncon-
stitutional methods of addressing Argentina's economic and politi-
cal crises. In such a climate, the Court might be excused for
considering social exigencies when examining the law, thereby
matching its expectations to those of the most politically signifi-
cant groups in society.1 86 Even Argentine scholars ascribe to the
Court the power to engage in extra-textual constitutional inter-
pretation."7 This national recognition that the judiciary engages
in contextual interpretation of the Constitution certainly creates a
permissive atmosphere in which responsive law has thrived.
However, while social forces may clamor for legal instrumen-
talism to advance societal goals, Argentineans openly question the
Court's independence and ethics. While this national cognitive
dissonance appears hypocritical, at times the Court's responsive-
ness and its obedience to the Executive have bordered on the bur-
lesque.'88 The "stolen decision" scandal8 9 exemplifies the lengths
to which the Court has gone to accommodate the Argentine gov-
ernment. In the case of Banco Patagonico c. Metalurgica Skay
Soc. de Hecho, six justices of the Court denied the Central Bank's
request for a rehearing in a case in which it had ordered the Cen-
tral Bank to pay fees to attorneys who had assisted it in liquidat-
ing a bank. 9 ° According to reports of the incident, the Minister of
the Economy considered the fee award a dangerous precedent, and
he sought the assistance of the President of the Court. The Presi-
dent allegedly had his law clerk remove the final judgment from
the Clerk's office, after which he circulated a new decision that
favored the government. The old decision simply disappeared. 1 '
When the Court seemingly has abandoned impartiality and
subordinated itself to the demands of the Executive,192 it has
learned that public support for its responsive style is superficial. 93
As one scholar noted in a somewhat different context, the Court
"is both too 'political' in that it developed de facto doctrine with no
constitutional authority, but also [may] not [be] 'political' enough,
186. Miller, supra note 12, at 78.
187. Id. at 162-63.
188. Id. at 152.
189. See Miller II, supra note 58, at 375, 396-97.
190. Banco Patagonico S.A. c. Metalurgica Skay Soc. de Hecho, 316 FALLOS 2321
(1993).
191. See Miller II, supra note 58, at 375, 396-97.
192. Miller II, supra note 58, at 375, 394.
193. See supra Part I.
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[if] it [had] failed to consider important social needs when inter-
preting the Constitution."19 4 This standard creates yet another
Morton's Fork for an already oppressed Court.
Interestingly, Argentineans once cheered loudly for former
President Menem's economic successes and his flamboyant per-
sonal style, and they nearly elected him to a third Presidential
term.19 Yet this very same public recently evinced great disgust
for the Court's apparent abject loyalty to former President
194. Miller, supra note 12, at 162.
195. After winning the first round of voting, former President Menem "quit
Argentina's presidential race to avoid a humiliating defeat in a runoff, paving the way
for Nestor Kirchner to win by default." Mary Milliken, Menem Quits Argentina Race,
(May 14, 2003), available at http://news.ft.com. See also Jon Jeter, Voters in
Argentina Atwitter Over Menem, WASH. POST, April 29, 2003, at A17 ("[Former
President] Menem emerged from Sunday's presidential balloting with 24 percent of
the vote, topping a crowded field of 18 candidates. He will face Nestor Kirchner[, then
President Duhalde's hand-picked successor], who took 22 percent, in a May 18[, 2003]
runoff. . . . Throughout his campaign, Menem portrayed himself almost as a
messianic figure in Argentina politics, frequently comparing himself to Peron ...
'Sixteen months ago I was in jail,' he said as he stood with his wife, a former Chilean
beauty queen half his age."). See also Simon Gardner, Feud Rips Argentina's
Peronists Apart as Vote Looms, (Feb. 23, 2003), available at http://www.reuters.com
(last visited Feb 24, 2003) ("Menem can still pull in votes, even with recent inquiries
into his 1989-1999 mandate. Last year, he served five months of house arrest during
an arms-trafficking probe and allegations surfaced he covered up a deadly bombing
for a [U.S.]$10 million bribe."); Jon Jeter, He's Back on the Ballot: Argentina's Former
President Seeks Return, WASH. POST, (Feb. 9, 2003), available at http://www.newsday.
com/news/nationworld/world/ny-wolati093122677feb09,0,1052099.story?coll=NY-orld
news-print (last visited Feb. 16, 2003) ("'He' is Carlos Menem, 72, the ex-president
who is Argentina's most dominant and divisive politician since Juan and Eva Peron
and the pivotal figure in the presidential election set for April. Amid Argentina's
worst economic crisis in history, polls show Menem within striking distance of his
rivals in the ruling Peronist party."). Many are appalled at Menem's return to
Argentine politics. "Argentines went to the polls to elect their first president of the
21st century. The final tally in that tragicomedy known as Argentina indicated that
the narrow plurality of the populace who voted for Carlos Menem were largely
unwilling to embrace the future, but instead remain a prisoner of a shameful past and
a wretched legacy left by the former president. Menem's dark and forbidding
bestowals on the nation consists of indescribable scandals, the further corruption of
the judiciary and other dire consequences of an economic policy that directly led to the
worst economic crisis that Argentines have seen in more than a century .... In most
seasoned and self-respecting nations that uphold the rule of law,.., the public would
have clamorously demanded that Menem's numerous indiscretions land him in prison
instead of being on the verge of again experiencing his third inauguration. In 2001,
the former president spent 5 months under house arrest on account of arms-
trafficking for personal aggrandizement and is also alleged to have accepted a
[U.S.]$10 million bribe from Arab terrorists in exchange for covering up details
surrounding the bombings of Buenos Aires-based Jewish facilities in the 1990's."
Press Release, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Argentina's Presidential Election: A
Populace That Has Lost Its Head, Heart and Compass Direction, (Apr. 29, 2003),
available at http://www.coha.org.
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Menem. 19 Is it possible to logically explain this seeming contra-
diction? Perhaps it is explicable, if the Argentine public perceives,
and is entitled to expect, that the Supreme Court and all other
Argentine judicial institutions, will function rationally, objec-
tively, and independently, unmoved by the inevitable swings in
public opinion. This author questions, however, whether such
expectations are reasonable in light of the societal and historical
constraints upon the Argentine Court.
Thus, the Court's reputational reality and its authority are
not so easily described or categorized. While its constitutional
jurisprudence does suffer from interpretive inconsistencies, the
Court, like its predecessors, is a product of the environment in
which it operates. Given the Court's role in the constitutional
order, its relationship to the Executive, and its struggle to survive
and to remain relevant in the face of cataclysmic political
upheaval throughout the nation's history, interpretive themes
might be expected to be somewhat discordant.
Complaints about the Argentine judicial system often focus on
the justices and judges populating the bench instead of addressing
the weakness of the institution itself.197 Individual Argentine
judges stand up well to this scrutiny. Indeed, a number of Latin
American judges enjoy international recognition for their scholar-
ship. 98 Many also actively participate on international legal
projects and make significant contributions to legal reforms
worldwide.199
Perhaps, then, the problem lies not with the Argentine
Supreme Court or even with the country's judicial system, but
with all Argentine institutions. As noted by one Argentine author,
"It's the state, stupid."' 00 The fragility of the nation's public insti-
tutions is widely acknowledged."' When "anarchy" and "chaos"
196. See supra Part I.
197. A discussion of the systemic problems with Latin American judicial systems is
beyond the scope of this Article, but see Rosenn, Protection of Judicial Independence,
supra note 118. See also Symposium, The Role of Legal Institutions in the Economic
Development of the Americas, supra note 20.
198. See Rosenn, Protection of Judicial Independence, supra note 118, at 32.
199. Id.
200. Santiago Real de Azua, In Other Words: Anxious in Argentina, FOREIGN POL'Y,
available at http://www.ciaonet.org/olj/fp/fp-novdec02_res0l.html (last visited May
30, 2003) (quoting MARIANO GRONDONA, LA REALIDAD, EL DESPERTAR DEL SUENO
ARGENTINO (2001)).
201. See Lindsey, supra note 112. See also Campuzano, supra note 80 ("[The
wheels of government power [in Argentina] are coming off.").
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are common terms in the national dialogue,0 2 one must question
whether the Court truly merits the particularized attention that it
has drawn. While courts can and do have significant impacts on
the communities in which they operate, it would be "absurd" to
expect the Argentine Supreme Court to take the lead in institut-
ing widespread and profound societal change throughout the
nation.2 3
IV. CONSEQUENCES: A MORTON'S FORK AND A
MORAL HAZARD
A. A Morton's Fork - Which Pitch to Choose?
Given the notoriety of the tribunal and the highly publicized
nature of the issue, the pesification appeal hoisted the Argentine
Supreme Court upon a Morton's Fork.20 4 Logically, this Fork had
at least three prongs that the Court might grasp. 25 First, the
Court might have upheld the pesification decree. Conversely, the
Court's deliberations might have consumed so much time that
events would have overtaken it and mooted the issue. This tactic
would have allowed the Court to abstain from making any pro-
nouncements on the constitutionality of the decree, a tergiversa-
tion that, while ostensibly removing the Court from the immediate
fray, of course would have had its own consequences. Finally, the
Court could have decided, and did decide, that the pesification
decree is unconstitutional. 26 These prongs are considered in turn.
A Court ruling upholding the pesification decree would have
presented a Janus-faced duality. The positive face of such a ruling
clearly would have been a victory and a boon for the Argentine
executive branch, allowing it to pursue its economic reform pack-
age unhindered. A declaration that pesification was constitu-
tional would have preserved the status quo and prevented
dramatic and potentially cataclysmic reversals in the slow, but
steady, recovery that the nation's economy has been experienc-
202. Cf. Argentina: More Chaos, supra note 9; Le Gras, Argentine Leader Says
Court Ruling May Bring Chaos, supra note 5.
203. Garay, supra note 22, at 193.
204. The derivation of the phrase Morton's Fork is discussed supra note 17.
205. While John Morton's original Fork had only two prongs, the author has taken
artistic license and expanded its design. For brevity's sake, the author will forego the
opportunity to explore the myriad procedural positions that the Court may have
taken in such an appeal and will focus on the substantive alternatives.
206. See San Luis, Provincia de, __ FALLos __ (Arg. CSJN Mar. 5, 2003), supra note
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ing.2°7 The government might have been so pleased that it would
have given the Court some relief from the continuing public criti-
cisms and impeachment threats, although, based upon the tense
relationship between these governmental branches, any such
reprieve likely would have been temporary."°8
The negative gaze of a "constitutional" ruling on pesification
would have fallen on the hapless Argentineans who would lose all
hope of recovering the value of their converted deposits."9 This
ruling would have served only to confirm the disenchanted pub-
lic's cynical view of the Court as a corrupt puppet of the Executive
and to further erode their confidence in the judicial system.210
Courts which do not themselves pay tribute to the law of the land
cannot compel others to do so, thereby discouraging parties from
using the judicial system to resolve disputes. In this event, public
concerns that the Argentine courts are "obsolete" would not have
appeared overly hyperbolic.21'
A "constitutional" ruling by the Court also would have had an
impact extending well beyond Argentina's borders. Argentina's
prospects for continued international financing might have been
complicated by the protests of the membership of multilateral
development institutions. 212  Too, foreign banks and investors
would have been forced to confront the negative face of a Janus-
like "constitutional" ruling as their once dollar-denominated
investments would be fixed at the value of the much-weakened
peso. This result certainly would have increased the legal risk fac-
tor for parties considering investments in Argentina, further iso-
lating the nation from the much-needed capital that international
investors can offer to stable and investor-friendly environments.1 3
As one Argentine lawyer mourned, "I see deals collapse - I see
potential investors who decide not to come to [Argentina] -
207. See infra note 239.
208. See supra notes 11-16 and accompanying text.
209. See Argentine Judges Face Corruption Probe, supra note 11.
210. See, e.g., Perez, supra note 12, at 372. See also Miller, supra note 12, at 151-
52.
211. See Miller, supra note 12, at 151-52.
212. For an enlightening discussion on how the governments of individual member
States influence the policies and procedures of multilateral institutions, see Ian A.
Bowles & Cyril F. Kormos, Environmental Reform at the World Bank: The Role of the
U.S. Congress, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 777 (1995).
213. See, e.g., Helift & Raszewski, Argentina Supreme Court's Politics Play Into
Ruling on Peso, supra note 24 ("The effect of the judiciary's lack of independence now
extends beyond politics and risks further discouraging foreign investment and
stunting economic growth after the economy shrank 12 percent last year, analysts
said.").
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because of the legal risks."214
Delay was yet another prong on the Court's Morton's Fork.
The Court's continuing delay in ruling on the pesification decree's
constitutionality might have obviated any need for it to rule on the
issue.211 The government is reported to have pressured the Court
to postpone a ruling until the country's financial picture had
improved to the point that it could manage the format and the
timing of a return of dollar deposits.216
There is historical precedent for such tactical maneuvering on
the part of the Argentine Supreme Court. For example, in the late
1980's, the Argentine Executive issued a decree establishing social
security pension levels.217 When challenges to the pension decree
reached the Supreme Court, it ruled against the Executive.2 8 In
response, the Executive issued an emergency decree that froze
pension levels, suspended all litigation and executions of judg-
ments against the State for failure to pay the amounts required by
law, and suspended the filing of any new administrative or judi-
cial actions on the issue.1 9 Of course, these actions were chal-
lenged all the way to the Court, yet, somehow, the Supreme Court
delayed issuing any decisions in the relevant cases pending before
it and avoided ruling on the validity of the suspension decree.
When the suspension was lifted and a new law passed that reorga-
nized the pension system, the Court held both the suspension on
litigation and on executions of judgments as moot.220
214. See Lindsey, supra note 112. See also Helft & Raszewski, Argentina Supreme
Court's Politics Play Into Ruling on Peso, supra note 24 ("Some foreign investors say
the courts are unpredictable. A local unit of AES Corp. is among foreign-owned
utilities that have threatened to leave Argentina after courts blocked rate increases
they said were needed to compensate for the currency's 70 percent drop last year.
'The blatant politics in the judicial system stops foreign investors on [sic] their
tracks [,]'" (quoting a partner at a prominent Miami law firm that recently established
an Argentine unit)).
215. Speculation was rampant that the Court might grasp the delay Fork. A news
report dated September 14, 2002 noted that a "Supreme Court decision over an earlier
case by one saver against 'pesification' has been expected for weeks." Le Gras,
Argentine Leader Says Court Ruling May Bring Chaos, supra note 5. Later news
reported that the Court had again delayed its ruling until February 2003. See
Argentine High Court Postpones Peso Ruling Until Feb, supra note 6.
216. Argentine High Court Postpones Peso Ruling Until Feb, supra note 6 ("[Tjhe
government could issue bonds with long term maturity dates to Argentines, to spread
the cost over time.").
217. Executive Decree 2196, A.D.L.A. 4180 (Arg. 1986), B.O. (Arg.), 2 Dec. 1986.
For a detailed and scholarly discussion of this event, see Miller, supra note 12, at 164-
67.
218. Rolon Zappa, 308 FALLOS 1848 (1986).
219. Executive Decree 2196, supra note 217, at 4182.
220. Humberto Gomez, 311 FALLOS 2238 (1988). For an account of other examples
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Consider also the Court's unfortunate "approval" of the inter-
mittent military coups that have intervened in Argentina's civil-
ian governmental processes.22' More recently, the Court
sidestepped a controversial issue by ruling that families of the
desaparecidos222 lacked the standing to sue,223 thereby refusing to
consider the legality of former President Menem's pardons of mili-
tary officers charged with abuses during the nation's "Dirty War"
and implicitly validating the brutal torture and murder of
thousands of Argentineans. 224 These maneuvers, however, have
had their own consequences, as would have a continuing delay on
the pesification issue.
While a delay or a similar tactical maneuver in the pesifica-
tion appeal might have proven to be politically expedient, and,
ultimately, might merely have prolonged the Argentine public's
agony and not caused it greater harm than that which it already
had suffered, it certainly would have raised philosophical ques-
tions about the role of the rule of law, in the form of the Constitu-
tion, and that of the nation's courts, in Argentina's constitutional
democracy. What is the Court's duty in this instance? Should
necessity, as perceived by elected officials, prevail over the norma-
tive rule of law, and are courts the proper body to resolve that
question? Is the Court bound to strictly enforce the language of
the nation's Constitution without regard to societal concerns? Or
is the Court permitted, or even obliged, to consider social interests
of "deference through delay," see Miller II, supra note 58, at 383-85 ("Virtually the
same tactic of deference through delay was used by the Supreme Court to avoid
questioning the emergency decree that changed the national currency from the
Argentine Peso to the Austral. . . . The tactic ofjudicial deference through delay was
also used by the judiciary generally to avoid several potential confrontations. For
example, due to delays in the lower courts, the court system took nearly two years to
resolve an action complaining of the seizure of the client files of a major law firm by a
Congressional committee. . . . Ultimately, the case ended with the Supreme Court
holding it moot.").
221. See supra note 105.
222. During Argentina's so-called Guerra Sucia, or Dirty War, between 1976 and
1983, it has been estimated that between 10,000-30,000 people either died or
disappeared without a trace, giving rise to the oft-used phrase, the desaparecidos. See
generally LAIN GUEST, BEHIND THE DISAPPEARANCES: ARGENTINA'S DIRTY WAR AGAINST
HuMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS (1990). See also http://www.desaparecidos.
orglarg; http://www.yendor.com/vanished.
223. Riveros, Omar S. y Otros, [1991-I] J.A. 306 (1991).
224. For a discussion of the legal response to the chilling desaparecidos
phenomenon and of Menem's pardons, see Banks & Carrio, supra note 3, at 34-40.
See also Sergio L.B. Pulcini y Oscar A. Dobla, L.L. 421 (Arg. CN Com. 1990) (The
Supreme Court dismissed an appeal, or a recurso de apelacion, for lack of jurisdiction
in a case involving criminal convictions that clearly were a violation of an existing
Court precedent).
2003] 423
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:3
when interpreting constitutional text? Only when these questions
are resolved can one determine whether the Argentine Court
would have been shirking its constitutional duty by delaying a rul-
ing so as to moot the pesification issue. All constitutional democ-
racies must decide this issue, and any one country's decision may
vary greatly from that of its neighbor depending upon its history
and cultural predilections.
What the Court did, however, was strike down the pesifica-
tion decree on constitutional grounds.225 In a five-to-three vote,
the justices ruled that the compulsory conversion violated funda-
mental property rights of bank depositors. 26 Citing Article 17 of
the Constitution,227 the Court stated that the decree "trampled pri-
vate property in a way that is incompatible with the protection
that the constitution warrants as it exceeds the limits allowed by
the court's jurisprudence when faced with economic
"28emergencies.
Might the Court not, therefore, claim a moral victory? It
legitimately can wrap itself in the clear text of the Constitution,
embracing a rationalist approach to constitutional interpretation
that many claim it had all but abandoned.229 This ruling also is an
apparent victory for Argentine depositors whose savings were dev-
astated by the law's forced conversion. 23 Thus soothed, the public
might view the Court in a more favorable light, interpreting its
ruling as an exercise of the Court's independence from a domi-
neering Executive.23'
The international financial community also likely will
respond positively to the Court's ruling invalidating the pesifica-
225. San Luis, Provincia de, - FALLOS - (Arg. CSJN Mar. 5, 2003), supra note 2.
226. Id. See also Rohter, Policy on Peso is Overturned in Argentina, supra note 6.
227. San Luis, Provincia de, __ FALLOS - (Arg. CSJN Mar. 5, 2003), supra note 2.
See ARG. CONST. art. 17 ("Property may not be violated, and no inhabitant of the
Nation can be deprived thereof except by virtue of a sentence based on law.
Expropriations in the public interest must be authorized by law and previously
compensated."). The members of the Court also cited numerous other decrees and
laws in its ruling, including a 2001 law enacted to induce depositors to maintain their
dollar accounts. San Luis, Provincia de, - FALLos - (Arg. CSJN Mar. 5, 2003),
supra note 2. As this is not a case comment, this author will leave a detailed analysis
of the ruling to others and will focus on its ramifications.
228. Argentina Court Orders Payback of Frozen Deposits, (Mar. 7, 2003), available
at http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2003/3/3/151927.shtml/ (quoting San
Luis, Provincia de, __ FALLos - (Arg. CSJN Mar. 5, 2003), supra note 2).
229. For a discussion of the Court's constitutional jurisprudence, see supra Part
III.C.
230. See supra Part I.
231. See, e.g., Perez, supra note 12. But see supra notes 24 and 154 for those taking
a cynical view concerning the political implications of the Court's ruling.
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tion decree. 232 Countless investments and loans233 of international
multilateral development institutions and of institutional and pri-
vate international investors and lenders were affected by the
pesification decree. These parties strenuously denounced the law,
threatening legal action on the grounds that pesification unlaw-
fully seized property and nullified existing contracts.2 34  This
Court ruling has the potential to restore the dollar-denominations
to internationally-held investments 235 and likely will boost the in-
ternational community's confidence in Argentina's legal frame-
work.
Restored investor confidence potentially could result in sub-
stantial benefits for the Argentine market. If the Argentine
Supreme Court is able to convince the international community
that the nation's judicial system is impartial, is free from execu-
tive influence, and is protective of legal rights, money may begin
232. However, the Court's ruling has the potential to complicate Argentina's
relationship with the IMF. See Rohter, Policy on Peso is Overturned in Argentina,
supra note 6. The debt-extension agreement that Argentina signed with the IMF in
January 2003, see Argentina, IMF Agree On Loan, supra note 90, requires that the
government reach a rapid settlement with the banks on pesification issues.
Depending upon the scope of the Court's ruling, and depending upon what form the
reimbursements take, i.e., cash or bonds, the cost of the redollarization to the
Argentine government and the banks might be as low as U.S.$9 billion or reach as
high as U.S.$35 billion. See S&P Comments on San Luis, Argentina, Bank Deposits,
(Mar. 6, 2003), available at http://www.reuters.com. This could seriously compromise
Argentina's financial position as its dollar reserves are estimated to be approximately
U.S.$10 billion. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 6.
233. The San Luis ruling did not determine whether the pesification of dollar-
denominated loans and debt is constitutional. San Luis, Provincia de, - FALLOS __
(Arg. CSJN Mar. 5, 2003), supra note 2. See also Brooks, supra note 2. However, the
Court apparently has hinted that it might not rule against pesification in the debt
and loan cases. See, e.g., Gardner, supra note 6 ("In a sour note for banks, devalued
loans are not likely to be turned back into dollars.").
234. See Argentina: More Chaos, supra note 9 ("'By upsetting well-established
property rights and nullifying contracts, the government is reducing Argentina's
prospects for returning to economic growth,' [Jim Saxton, chairman of the Joint
Economic Committee of the U.S. Congress] said in a statement that referred to the
U.S. Code's requirements to cut off aid when U.S. property is seized or contracts
nullified. 'Secure property rights are essential for economic growth .... The IMF and
other international financial institutions should stress this message to Argentina's
government.'"). See also Helft & Raszewski, Argentina Supreme Court's Politics Play
Into Ruling on Peso, supra note 24 ("Some foreign investors say the courts are
unpredictable. A local unit of AES Corp. is among foreign-owned utilities that have
threatened to leave Argentina after courts blocked rate increases they said were
needed to compensate for the currency's 70 percent drop last year. 'The blatant
politics in the judicial system stops foreign investors on [sic] their tracks.'" (quoting a
partner at a prominent Miami law firm that recently established an Argentine unit)).
235. Recall that the San Luis ruling resolved only the dispute of the parties before
it. See supra note 2.
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to flow back into Argentina. A country's legal risk is a significant
element of virtually every investor's risk assessment process.2 6
Investors will be attracted to jurisdictions with strong legal sys-
tems, including not only well-developed and nondiscriminatory
legal doctrine, but also efficient and impartial procedures for
resolving disputes.237
A "moral" victory for the Court, however, could be a pyrrhic
one. While legal scholars might debate whether such concerns are
relevant to a court's constitutional deliberations, the economic
impact of the ruling invalidating the pesification decree poten-
tially could be catastrophic. 8 While there have been recent
improvements in Argentina's economy,239 the system still might
not have the dollar reserves to survive a rush of dollar withdraw-
als. It has been estimated that Argentine banks would be forced
to return between U.S.$9 and U.S.$35 billion to bank depositors,24 °
236. See, e.g., International Country Risk Guide, Information on the Rating System,
at http://www.icrgonline.com/ [hereinafter ICRG]. The ICRG provides a quantitative
measure of a country's risks, including a rating pertaining to each country's laws.
Investors, multilaterals, and insurers utilize this Guide, as do others. Cf. Dun &
Bradstreet, Information on Country ReportTM , at http://www.dnb.com/dbproducts;
Moody's, Information on Sovereign Ratings, at http://www.moodys.com; Standard &
Poor's, Corporate Ratings Criteria 1, 35-37, available at http://www.
standardandpoors.com/europe/deutsch/content/resourcecenter/pdf/corpcrit2002.pdf.
See generally Symposium, The Role of Legal Institutions in the Economic Development
of the Americas, supra note 20.
237. See generally Symposium, The Role of Legal Institutions in the Economic
Development of the Americas, supra note 20.
238. "[Tlhe ruling is potentially ruinous for the banks that now face a huge
liability." DeRosa, supra note 154.
239. Larry Rohter, Signs of Economic Life in Argentina, N.Y. TIMEs, (Feb. 25,
2003), available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F50612FA34590C
768EDDAB0894DB404482 ("[Tihe financial sector is finally showing tentative signs
of recovery."); Argentina's Nielson - Debt Restructuring Moves Ahead, (Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.reuters.com (last visited Feb. 21, 2001) ("[Argentine Finance
Secretary Guillermo] Nielson said the economic indicators were encouraging. The
country's industrial output rose 16.4 percent in January from a year earlier. Last
year the economy contracted about 11 percent amid the worst ever economic crisis.
Inflation has slowed to near zero and bank deposits are recovering."); EFE News
Service: ARGENTINA-GOVERNMENT: Duhalde Thanks Aides for Saving Argentina
from "Anarchy," (Dec. 30, 2002), at http://hoovnews.hoovers.com ("'There is a new
economy up and running, based on production and work for our people, following the
collapse of the previous model[.]'" (quoting then President Duhalde)). But see Andres
Oppenheimer, Argentina's Economic Alchemy - Nonpayment of Debts Can't Be
Written Off, (Feb. 27, 2003), at http://www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/column
ists/andres-oppenh ("Stop the presses! Argentina is celebrating an economic recovery,
which, if real, would be a first of its kind: It would prove that you can stop your
foreign debt payments, insult your creditors, reject conditions from international
financial institutions and get your country's economy back on its feet.").
240. The difference in these estimates pertains to the scope of the Court's ruling.
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funds that many believe the Argentine system does not have. 4' A
deepening liquidity crisis could scuttle Argentina's fragile eco-
nomic recovery and threaten to send the nation into another eco-
nomic tailspin. 242 None of the parties involved would benefit from
this chain of events.
Even should the economy endure a run by depositors on dollar
accounts, there are numerous practical difficulties implicit in the
ruling that pesification is unconstitutional. While beyond the
scope of a theoretical article, questions have arisen concerning
how banks or others are to "re-convert" the converted peso
accounts back into dollars. Would the conversion be required to
take place immediately?243  If not, does the Constitution imply
some sort of deadline? At what exchange rate?24 Could the banks
offer bonds or some other instrument in lieu of dollars?245 Would
the banks or the government be forced to factor in lost opportunity
costs, etc. . . ? Without considering the propriety of judicially
addressing such details, courts generally are ill equipped to
respond to such matters.
Further, while the Court appears to be enjoying a respite
from the heated invective heaped upon it in public protests and
could experience a boost in its public approval ratings, these bene-
fits likely will be short-lived. After the initial euphoria has faded,
the Argentine public inevitably will join the government and the
Depending upon what date is chosen for compensation, the Court's holding might
apply only to those with money trapped in the banking system as of the date of the
ruling, or it potentially also could benefit those depositors who held balances at the
time of the pesification decree. See S&P Comments on San Luis, Argentina, Bank
Deposits, supra note 232.
241. Argentine Gov Slams Court Ahead of Peso Ruling - Reports, Dow Jones Int'l
News, Dec. 24, 2002, WL DJINS database. See also supra note 238.
242. See supra Part I.
243. In the San Luis ruling, the Court ordered the parties to work out the terms of
the settlement within sixty days. San Luis, Provincia de, __ FALLOS _ (Arg. CSJN
Mar. 5, 2003), supra note 2. See also Rohter, Policy on Peso is Overturned in
Argentina, supra note 6 ("Apparently recognizing the potentially disruptive effect of
its decision, the Supreme Court gave the federal government and San Luis 60 days to
work out the terms of a settlement.").
244. See id.
245. Id. The general consensus is that the government will issue five to ten year
dollar-denominated bonds. See Argentina Court Orders Payback of Frozen Deposits,
supra note 228. "Despite the peso's drastic devaluation last year and the conversion of
all dollar accounts into local currency, [the Minister of the Economy] said savers
would get back 80 percent of their money through compensation in government
bonds." Smith, supra note 79. Commentators predict that this is likely to "anger
depositors who note the government has defaulted on debt owed private creditors.
Few investors with other choices would trust a new bond issue." Medina & Hall,
supra note 174.
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press in speculating about the Court's ulterior motives for the rul-
ing. 4  Governmental attacks on the ruling already have
appeared, as have editorials questioning the Court's loyalties 247
and calling to mind the charges of political blackmail leveled
against the tribunal during the public debate on the pesification
appeal.248
Too, Argentineans, like all Latin Americans, report a nearly
legendary "traditional disrespect for law,"249 an attitude that
encompasses legal institutions. For example, surveys indicate
that less than twenty percent of Latin Americans have confidence
in their judicial systems.25 ° Considering this systemic skepticism,
it is highly unlikely that one ruling from a highly maligned
Supreme Court will cause a paradigm shift in public opinion.
While it ultimately did not do so, grasping either the "consti-
tutional" or "delay" prong may have offered the Argentine Court,
the Executive, and perhaps even the Argentine public some of the
short term benefits previously discussed. However, it also would
have exacerbated the moral hazard25 1 that exists in Argentina.
The conduct of Argentine officials not only inspires cynicism
among the Argentine public, 2 2 it also undermines the "very con-
246. See, e.g., Helft & Raszewski, Argentina Supreme Court's Politics Play Into
Ruling on Peso, supra note 24 ("'The judges on the court just operate politically ....
They were appointed because they are friends and accomplices of [former President]
Menem and their rulings have been contradictory and self-serving.'"). See also
DeRosa, supra note 154 ("Interestingly, [then Argentine President] Duhalde's people
are spinning the court's action [in the pesification case] to say that the judiciary is
playing politics, trying to discredit the government by destroying what is left of
Argentina's battered economy. They say this favors former President Carlos Menem's
chances of defeating Duhalde['s hand-picked successor] in the election. And leave no
doubt about it, Menem is out front and center in favor of the court's ruling."); Waldie,
supra note 24 ("[An economist with Raymond James Argentina... said the ruling
may have more political than economic consequences. The country is holding
elections . . . . Mr. Duhalde tried to fight the ruling for fear that it would endanger
stability ahead of the ... vote. But... others say the Supreme Court is believed to be
loyal to Mr. Duhalde's nemesis, former President Carlos Menem, a leading candidate
in the election.").
247. See supra note 246.
248. See Perez, supra note 12, at 372. See also Argentine Court Mulls Account
Conversion, (Dec. 2, 2002), at http://www.washtimes.com/upi-breaking/20021128-
041415-1305r.htm; Le Gras, Courts Threaten Argentina's Banks, supra note 1.
249. Rosenn, Latin American Constitutionalism, supra note 32, at 25.
250. Panel Two, Berenson Remarks, Symposium, The Role of Legal Institutions in
the Economic Development of the Americas, supra note 20, at 179, 183. See also supra
notes 168-69.
251. See supra note 21.
252. See Helft & Raszewski, Argentina Supreme Court's Politics Play Into Ruling
on Peso, supra note 24 ("'Whatever the politics of this court, the way this government
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cept of government by a written constitution[] "253
B. A Moral Hazard
Economists and scholars long have recognized the role that
moral hazards play in causing severe financial crises.5 4 In the
context of a market crash, moral hazards result when investors or
other actors assume that some enabling entity, such as a govern-
ment or a multilateral such as the IMF, is providing a guarantee,
implicit or explicit, against a portion of their losses. The belief in
this guarantee distorts the market and creates incentives for
these actors to take imprudent risks.255
This author posits that the moral hazard theory has a much
wider application. Specifically, in the context of this Article, the
moral hazard concept is relevant to the political dynamic that
exists in Argentina. Because the Executive and other Argentine
lawmakers perceive the nation's Supreme Court to be a captive to
their legal maneuverings, these officials have become emboldened
to act outside of constitutional limits or the bounds of the rule of
law, confidant that their actions likely will be sanctioned by the
Court.25 6 Such are the consequences of a "compliant" Argentine
Supreme Court.
Moral hazard problems may stem from the behavior of both
the "actors" (the lawmakers) and the "enablers" (the Court).257 As
to the actors/lawmakers, a compliant and politicized Supreme
Court creates incentives for officials to take excessive risks with
little or no regard for Argentine law when fashioning remedies
and defining policies in times of crisis. When the Supreme Court
repeatedly ignores the plain language of the nation's Constitution
to validate governmental conduct, the Court creates a moral haz-
ard for lawmakers, who suffer no consequences for their blatant
failure to comply with Argentine law. "If [governments, corpora-
tions, or individuals] do not bear the full consequences of their
actions, they will tend to be more careless because they can exter-
nalize the consequences of their action[, ]" thus shifting to others
has broken contracts and rules is unprecedented . . . . Something had to be done
about that.'" (quoting Professor Ivan Cullen, University of Rosario)).
253. Cf. Garay, supra note 22, at 202.
254. See, e.g., Partnoy, supra note 21, at 757-58.
255. Id. at 754-60.
256. Cf. Banks & Carrio, supra note 3, at 1-6.
257. Cf. Partnoy, supra note 21, at 754-60.
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the burden of their irresponsible conduct.5 8
In this instance, the victims of the government's pesification
decree were the multilateral development institutions and their
member countries, private banks and lenders, foreign investors,
and, to a lesser extent, Argentineans with dollar accounts. And,
while the Court's ruling striking down the pesification decree
addresses this abuse of executive power, these victims still bore
the brunt of Argentina's financial crisis, an economic ill for which
pesification was only one attempted cure. Other treatments for
this disease, such as the nation's default on its debts, also caused
significant side effects for Argentina's investors and lenders,
infecting them with a virulent strain of Argentina's symptoms.
Spreading its disease to these third parties, even temporarily,
allowed Argentina to escape with a much milder case of the dis-
ease to which many believe the country willingly exposed itself.
Because Argentine lawmakers did not feel constrained even by the
country's Constitution, it imposed the burden of its "profligate"
spending and its unsustainable run-up of external debt on its
lenders, investors, and citizens." 9
The ramifications of shifting this burden onto the backs of the
international financial community may prove to be long-term and
severe. Despite the Court's pesification ruling, multilateral and
foreign lenders and investors may seek safer and more profitable
investment climates for the capital that Argentina very desper-
ately needs, the "rush to the exits" and capital flight syndromes.26°
So too may Argentine financial, regulatory, and legal institutions
find themselves isolated, perhaps even made obsolete, in the con-
text of international financial transactions.26' Foreign parties
involved in any future financial dealings with Argentina likely
will prudently demand the importation of foreign legal rules, pro-
cedures, and institutions to govern their arrangements. This
potentially limits the types of financing available to Argentina
258. Viet D. Dinh, Remarks, Symposium, The Role of Legal Institutions in the
Economic Development of the Americas, supra note 20, at 20.
259. See Lindsey, supra note 112. See also Oppenheimer, supra note 239.
260. For example, according to the Argentina Statistics and Census Office, Indec,
U.S.$14.486 billion fled Argentina in 2002, a 246% increase over the U.S.$4.668
billion in 2001. 11,5 Billion U.S. Dollars Fled Argentina in 2002, (Mar. 29, 2003), at
http://www.falklands.com/Detalle.asp?NUM=2009&Palabra=11,5%20billion. See also
Partnoy, supra note 21, at 758-59.
261. "[The failure to provide an institutional framework that secures a high degree
of compliance with law and security for personal liberties and private property only
exacerbates the basic task of producing economic prosperity." See Rosenn, Latin
American Constitutionalism, supra note 32, at 30.
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and its citizens. For example, issuers of Argentine mortgage-
backed securities or other similar financing vehicles might not
attract foreign investors as the collateral necessarily would be
governed by Argentine law, a risky proposition. The choice of New
York law and of the procedure and forum of an international arbi-
tral tribunal could become a common contractual demand,
marginalizing Argentina's legal institutions and community.
262
Because the Court's constitutional jurisprudence is unpredict-
able and occasionally reveals an utter disregard for the text of
that venerable document, it exposes Argentine lawmakers and the
Argentine public to serious moral hazards. If the Court is uncon-
cerned with constitutional guarantees, surely one cannot expect
public officials and Argentine citizens to evince much regard for
its requirements. Excesses in the exercise of judicial power exac-
erbate the disrespect that lawmakers and citizens have for consti-
tutional values, the rule of law,263 and Argentine institutions in
general.264 The effects of general lawlessness and a "breezy indif-
ference to rules and responsibilities"261 stretch far beyond the con-
fines of the country's financial markets.
The Court too is plagued by its own moral hazard as a result
of its responsive rulings and its slavish devotion to certain execu-
tive conduct. Any judge who thwarts the will of a dominant Exec-
utive does so at great peril. 6 A responsive Court that fails to
respond to the Executive or Congress "is simply too great a politi-
cal risk to that Executive[ " or the congressional body.267 In such
262. See Lindsey, supra note 112. There are Argentineans who would welcome this
international isolation. "'Let's live on our own,' [some Argentineans] say. This means
to renounce competition and not try to fit into an uptight and difficult First World
that demands certain disciplined behaviors." Carlos Alberto Montaner, Argentina
Can Be A Wealthy Nation Again, (Oct. 30, 2002), at http://www.miami.com/mldl
miamiherald/news/opinion/4399356.htm. In economic terms, this seems Utopian. "If
I stop paying my debts, I would obviously have more disposable income to buy food, or
go to the movies. But, eventually, the light would go out." Oppenheimer, supra note
239.
263. Cf. Banks & Carrio, supra note 3, at 4.
264. Cf. Rohter, Signs of Economic Life in Argentina, supra note 239 ("The long-
term challenge facing banks of all types [in Argentina] is to regain the confidence of
Argentine savers, who still feel that they have been defrauded by bankers and
politicians. Even with the recent surge in deposits, economists estimate that
Argentines have U.S.$110 billion in savings stashed under mattresses or in accounts
abroad, double the amount in the banking system.").
265. Santiago Real de Azua, supra note 200.
266. See Rosenn, Protection of Judicial Independence, supra note 118, at 31.
267. Miller, supra note 12, at 155.
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a situation, lawmakers may defy the Court28 or agitate for a
change in the Court's membership,269 leaving the Court with little
or no dignity and with virtually no job security.27 °
The Court also subjects itself to a nearly constant barrage of
criticism regarding its competence, qualifications, and bias. 7'
Even when the Court does act to uphold the rule of law, as it
appeared to do with regard to the pesification issue, its prior rul-
ings expose it to speculation and doubt.
272
What then is necessary to eliminate the moral hazards
endemic in the Argentine system? Certainly, a single, and possi-
bly aberrational, ruling will not eradicate these risks. Of course,
maintaining the confidence of the relevant actors, or, in this con-
text, public and international institutional confidence, is essential
to solving moral hazard problems.273 To accomplish this in Argen-
tina, a commitment would be required not only from the judiciary,
but also from Argentine civil society. A country's judiciary reflects
the values of the culture in which it exists, and Argentineans long
have expected, even demanded, that the Court defer to executive
authority and respond to social needs when performing its judicial
duties.274
268. For a discussion of the Executive Decree that invalidated, at least temporarily,
a Court decision on pension levels, see supra Part III.C.
269. As discussed supra Part III.B., every "civilian President since Peron has tried
to choose a docile Supreme Court." Miller, supra note 12, at 153. While the Argentine
Executive and the Congress did seek to impeach the justices of the Supreme Court in
2002, the impeachment charges were dropped in order to appease the IMF. See Helft
& Raszewski, Argentina Supreme Court's Politics Play Into Ruling on Peso, supra note
24. The IMF was concerned that conflict between the various branches of the
government would impede economic reform in the country. Id. This IMF scrutiny
may provide the members of the Court with a margin of safety, alleviating their fears
of governmental reprisals in the form of impeachment proceedings in cases in which
the Court is not responsive to the government's litigation positions.
270. Miller, supra note 12, at 152. See also Rosenn, Protection of Judicial
Independence, supra note 118, at 31.
271. See supra Part III.D.
272. See, e.g., Helift & Raszewski, Argentina Supreme Court's Politics Play Into
Ruling on Peso, supra note 24.
273. Cf. Partnoy, supra note 21, at 760.
274. Of course, a basic question concerns the nature of the law, particularly the
Argentine Constitution. In Latin America generally, and in Argentina specifically,
constitutions may mean something far different to the populace than the U.S.
Constitution means to residents of the U.S. In Argentina, the inclusion of a
substantial number of utopian provisions in the Constitution that are either
impossible or extremely difficult to enforce suggests that that the document is an
aspirational writing rather than a serious limitation on governmental power. See
Rosenn, Latin American Constitutionalism, supra note 32, at 26. If this is the case,
Argentineans should expressly recognize this characterization and relent in their
unrealistic demands of the Supreme Court.
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V. CONCLUSION
To conclude, the pesification issue raised a Morton's Fork
before the Argentine Supreme Court, with a sharp and dangerous
point topping each of the Fork's pitches. Regardless of the Court's
ultimate ruling,275 cries of outrage inevitably would have been
heard from some quarter.276
One must empathize with these oppressed justices. Despite
the extensive lip service paid to constitutional values in Argen-
tina, a true commitment to the rule of law appears to be superfi-
cial.277 The Court's position is untenable given the nation's strong
authoritarian history and a societal willingness to free the Court
from the textual constraints of the Constitution. Yet, paradoxi-
cally, the Court is scrutinized and criticized mercilessly when it
rules responsively.
This paradox, however, does not excuse the Court's sporadic
wholesale abandonment of its role in a democratic society. While
civil law judges traditionally have far less power than their com-
mon law counterparts,278 the Argentine Supreme Court long has
declared itself to be the final interpreter of the Constitution. 279 To
preserve this role, the justices must strive to maintain their inde-
pendence and their adherence to that ideal. In so doing, they need
not remain oblivious to social needs or political considerations,2 °
nor should the Court be expected to initiate the institutional
reforms that Argentina so desperately needs.
What is required, then, for such fundamental change is a soci-
etal commitment to good governance and the rule of law,28 ' not
simply one Supreme Court ruling. Securing effective institutional
reform entails the inclusion of civil society in the reform efforts
and a common understanding of the nature of the governing legal
framework.8 2
275. See San Luis, Provincia de, - FALLOS _ (Arg. CSJN Mar. 5, 2003), supra note
2.
276. See supra notes 24, 246. One report quoted a source that called the ruling
"nauseating." See Helft & Raszewski, Argentina Supreme Court's Politics Play Into
Ruling on Peso, supra note 24.
277. Cf. Rosenn, Protection of Judicial Independence, supra note 118, at 35.
278. Rosenn, Federalism in the Americas, supra note 84, at 21.
279. See Garay, supra note 22, at 197.
280. See Rosenn, Protection of Judicial Independence, supra note 118, at 3.
281. James Spinner, Remarks, Symposium, The Role of Legal Institutions in the
Economic Development of the Americas, supra note 20, at 47, 49.
282. Nancy Zucker Boswell, The Law, Expectation, and Reality in the Marketplace:
The Problems of and Responses to Corruption, Symposium, The Role of Legal
Institutions in the Economic Development of the Americas, supra note 20, at 139, 143.
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Likewise, a confidant, charismatic283 Supreme Court with a
predictable body of textually defensible constitutional jurispru-
dence could provide an effective antidote to executive and congres-
sional excesses 284 and could eliminate the moral hazards extant
when the tribunal acts exclusively as a political instrument of
these other governmental branches. This could breathe new life
into the rule of law in Argentina, a victory for the entire nation
and a foil for the Court's future Morton's Forks.
283. For an extrapolation of Weber's Sociology of Law and its description of the
types of "legitimate domination" in a system of responsive law, including that of
"charismatic" domination, see Miller, supra note 12, at 87-99.
284. Cf. Banks & Carrio, supra note 3, at 71.
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